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THE RENTAL CRISIS WILL NOT BE TELEVISED: THE CASE
FOR PROTECTING TENANTS UNDER CONSUMER
PROTECTION REGIMES
Eric Sirota*

ABSTRACT
The Foreclosure Crisis of the 2000s has likely hurt renters more than
homeowners. Incongruously, however, consumer enforcement agencies have been
far more zealous in protecting mortgagors than tenants. This Article explores the
under-protection of tenants as a class of consumers, particularly in a
“commoditized” rental market, and examines how consumer enforcement agencies
can more zealously incorporate tenant-protection into their mandates.
Much of the prior literature on the legal protections afforded tenants was
published in the wake of the consumer rights revolution of the 1970s. This Article
is the first to carefully reexamine, in the context of the modern rental market,
whether tenants should be protected as consumers and whether tenants have truly
reaped the benefits of consumer gains over the last half-century. The Article
analyzes original interviews with state consumer protection agencies, engages in
the first broad survey of state and federal tenant protection enforcement actions,
and provides a new review of the caselaw addressing whether tenants are covered
by consumer protection regimes.
Concluding that achieving systemic change through broad-scale policing of the
rental industry is both vital and often overlooked, the Article proposes specific
reforms that consumer protection agencies can adopt to better protect tenants.
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INTRODUCTION
America’s tenants have faced an affordability crisis since at least
1
the 1990s. Recent data indicates that, even without the pandemic,
more than half of tenants spend more than thirty percent of their
2
income on rent, thus qualifying them as “cost-burdened”; twentyfive percent of rental households are severely cost-burdened, which
means they pay more than fifty percent of their income towards
3
rent. These cost burdens will continue to increase, perhaps severely, as the pandemic continues. While governmental housing assistance programs offer some relief, less than one in four eligible
4
households receive such help.
5
As a result, “[e]victions have reached crisis levels.” In 2016, a
staggering 6.12% of tenants faced eviction proceedings and 2.34%
6
faced actual eviction. Matthew Desmond, the author of Evicted, has
calculated that in some large cities evictions are filed against more

1. See Richard Florida, The Deep Roots of America’s Affordability Crisis, CITYLAB (May 20,
2015, 3:58 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/05/the-deep-roots-of-americashousing-affordability-crisis/393773; see also Brenda Richardson, America’s Housing Affordability
Crisis Only Getting Worse, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
brendarichardson/2019/01/31/americas-housing-affordability-crisis-only-getting-worse/
#54a563a3104b.
2. Michael Hobbes, America’s Housing Crisis Is a Ticking Time Bomb, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 19, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/housing-crisis-inequality-harvard-report
_n_5b27c1f1e4b056b2263c621e; HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S
HOUSING
2019,
at
4
(2019)
[hereinafter
JCHS
2019],
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of
_the_Nations_Housing_2019%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/64KP-Y8MN].
3. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., The Impact of COVID-19 on Renters and Rental
Markets, YOUTUBE JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., at 8:03–9:07 (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o1sxVpDEY7M; see JCHS 2019, supra note 2, at 5. Note
that this article was drafted almost entirely before the pandemic. The pandemic increases
the cost burden on rental households, perhaps severely. Renters have in large part maintained rental payments by borrowing from family and dipping into often-meager savings,
and have avoided eviction due to eviction moratoriums, but these solutions are not sustainable. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS STUD., supra, at 13:32–18:53. We are likely headed towards
a new eviction crisis due to the pandemic. Id. at 29:00–29:22.
4. Policy Basics: Federal Rental Assistance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 15,
2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/policy-basics-federal-rental-assistance; see
also JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: EVOLVING
MARKETS AND NEEDS 7 (2013), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media
/imp/jchs_americas_rental_housing_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/K58M-6TPY] (“[From
2007-2011,] the share of income-eligible households receiving assistance shrank from an
already modest 27.4 percent to 23.8 percent.”). The ‘housing assistance programs’ discussed
here do not include the temporary emergency rental assistance provided as a response to
pandemic, but rather refer to long term housing subsidy programs, such as subsidized housing and housing choice voucher programs.
5. NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, PROTECT TENANTS, PREVENT
HOMELESSNESS 14 (2018) [hereinafter NLCHP], https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads
/2018/10/ProtectTenants2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ5N-AYGN].
6. Map & Data, PRINCETON UNIV. EVICTION LAB, https://evictionlab.org/map/#
/2016?geography=states&type=er (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
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7

than thirty percent of renters. Desmond’s estimate does not ac8
count for evictions through extra-judicial means. And we are
headed for a new crisis, on top of the existing eviction crisis, due to
9
the pandemic.
The situation faced by renters is partly attributable to the foreclosure crisis. But while the foreclosure crisis exacerbated the rent10
11
al crisis, the rental crisis was already well under way. Indeed,
tenants have long faced crisis because, for decades, wage increases
12
have not nearly kept up with rent increases. Shockingly,
“[a]djusting for inflation, the median rent payment rose sixty-one
percent between 1960 and 2016 while the median renter income
13
grew only five percent.” Concededly, this Article focuses on the
most vulnerable tenants, but this fact does not render its analysis
particularly narrow. First, a significant percentage of tenants face
14
vulnerable economic circumstances. Second, even more financial15
ly stable tenants face frequent abuse. Indeed, tenancy involves in16
herent vulnerabilities, though abuse is, of course, far more severe
towards the indigent.
Tenants, thus, face a litany of consumer abuses. The abuse tenants often suffer at the hands of landlords and property managers
cannot be divorced from these epidemic levels of housing instabil17
ity. Dwindling supply of affordable rental units forces tenants to
7. Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, In 83 Million Eviction Records, a Sweeping and Intimate New Look at Housing in America, N.Y TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Apr. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/07/upshot/millions-of-eviction-records-asweeping-new-look-at-housing-in-america.html [https://perma.cc/UZ6D-X9DM].
8. Id.
9. Harv. Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., supra note 3, at 29:00.
10. See NLCHP, supra note 5, at 10–11, detailing how the foreclosure crisis exacerbated
the rental crisis.
11. Florida, supra note 1; Richardson, supra note 1.
12. Hobbes, supra note 2.
13. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 2018, at 5 (2018), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports
/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3DS6FRE] [hereinafter JCHS 2018].
14. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On the Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms,
Evidence from the Residential Rental Market, 9 J.L. ANALYSIS 1, 24–25 fig.1 (2017) (documenting
the prevalence of misleading lease clauses).
16. For example, tenants, especially in multi-unit buildings, depend on landlords to
make repairs even where the tenants can afford such repairs themselves. See Joan L. Neisser,
The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict Liability Principles to Landlords, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
527, 530 (1990).
17. Andrea Castillo, Barbara Anderson & BoNhia Lee, Fresno Apartments Crawling with
Mice, Roaches but Fearful Tenants Stay Quiet, FRESNO BEE (May 8, 2016),
https://www.fresnobee.com/news/special-reports/housing-blight/article75831252.html
(describing cost-burdened tenants vulnerable to landlord abuse); Ezra Rosser, Exploiting the
Poor: Housing, Markets, and Vulnerability, 126 YALE L.J. F. 458, 460–61 (2017); Louis W. Fisher,
Paying for Pushout: Regulating Landlord Buyout Offers in New York City’s Rent-Stabilized Apartment,
50 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 491, 494–99 (2015); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
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live in substandard conditions. A study conducted by the Center
for American Progress found that approximately thirty million
homes in America are dangerous to live in due to unsafe housing
conditions, and this epidemic has grown worse as more Americans
19
have turned to renting.
But the abuses tenants face are by no means limited to habitability concerns. For example, in order to make room for wealthier
tenants or otherwise free up apartment space, landlords illegally
oust renters through intimidation, deception, or pretextual evic20
tions. Illegal confiscation of security deposits is also a common
problem. Fear of retaliation makes it uniquely difficult for tenants
to protect themselves. Many tenants are hesitant to assert their
21
rights for fear of retaliation. Undocumented tenants fear land22
lords will call immigration enforcement. Tenants may not even
know their rights are being violated, as they are often subject to il23
legal or misleading lease provisions. The cause of the eviction epidemic thus goes beyond the fact that tenants struggle to pay rent.
As stated by Desmond, “[e]viction is a cause, not just a condition,
24
of poverty.”
Despite these widespread abuses, tenants do not have legal parity with other consumers. For one, courts may interpret Unfair or
Deceptive Acts and Practice (UDAP) statutes, states’ primary con25
sumer protection laws, to not apply to tenants. As this Article
shows, however, even where such laws apply to tenants, consumer
enforcement agencies rarely use their enforcement power to pro26
tect tenants.

1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further
increases the landlord’s bargaining power and escalates the need for improving existing
stock.”); see also NLCHP, supra note 5, at 8 (noting that tenants represented by counsel are
exponentially less likely to face eviction, thus at least partially corroborating that eviction
may often result from landlord abuses).
18. See, e.g., Castillo et al., supra note 17.
19. Alex Fernandez Campbell, Gas Leaks, Mold, and Rats: Millions of Americans Live in
Hazardous Homes, THE ATLANTIC (July 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2016/07/gas-leaks-mold-and-rats-millions-of-americans-live-in-hazardous-homes/
492689/; see also Castillo et al., supra note 17 (noting that abusive landlords rent to a disproportionately high number of tenants).
20. Shaila Dewan, Evictions Soar in Hot Market; Renters Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/us/evictions-soar-in-hot-market-renters-suffer.html
[https://perma.cc/5FUC-MRN2]; Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by Funding
Needed Repairs, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 592–98 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Castillo et al., supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. See generally Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15.
24. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 299
(2016).
25. See discussion infra Section II.A.
26. See discussion infra Section I.D.
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It is essential that tenants be fully integrated into consumer protection regimes for multiple reasons. First, UDAP statutes provide
far more robust relief than tenant-landlord laws. Consumer protection laws often allow for the recovery of not only pecuniary loss,
but also attorneys’ fees, exemplary damages, emotional distress
27
damages, and for the imposition of equitable relief. The primary
remedy under tenant-landlord law is the tenant withholding rent
28
or standard contract damages.
Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this Article,
tenants would greatly benefit from receiving the full attention of
consumer enforcement agencies. These agencies, vested with
broad and flexible authority to enforce UDAP laws, have played a
key role in advancing the rights of consumers over the last half29
century. In fact, in some sense, the consumer rights movement
since the 1960s has been defined by the increased role of enforce30
ment agencies in protecting individual consumers. Tenants, however, have not been the beneficiaries of these efforts as, in practice,
consumer enforcement agencies do not fully incorporate tenants
31
into their mandates. Tenants must enforce their own rights,
32
though they can seldom afford counsel. This Article argues that
tenants are entitled to the same agency attention as similarly situated consumers.
Part II of this Article, thus, compares the respective formation of
the modern consumer protection legal regime and modern tenant
protection legal regime. Section I.A discusses the legal gains
achieved by consumers generally in the 1960s and 70s. Such gains
were largely defined by increased government protection of consumers of tangible goods and, to a lesser extent, financial products
and services. Part II.B discusses tenants’ legal gains during this
same period, illustrating that, while tenant gains were influenced
by the gains of consumers at large, tenants did not receive the full
benefit of the consumer protection movement. Section I.C discusses the next wave of consumer protection—that surrounding the fi-

27. See NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 13.1
(Carolyn Carter ed., 9th ed. 2016) [hereinafter NCLC], https://library.nclc.org/udap.
28. Id. See generally David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 389, 389, 407 (2011).
29. Prentiss Cox, Amy Wiedman & Mark Totten, Strategies for UDAP Enforcement, 55
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 37, 38, 42–46 (2018); see also Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 9, 19 (2000); Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 462 (2007); Christopher L.
Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL.
L. REV. 1057, 1060–61 (2016).
30. See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.C.
31. See discussion infra Section I.D.
32. Super, supra note 28, at 432 n.234.
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nancial crisis of the 2000s—which was defined by the formation of
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and increased
consumer enforcement agency activism against major mortgage
banks. Again, as discussed in Section I.D, these increased consumer protection efforts were not fully extended to tenants. Even
though tenants arguably suffered during the Financial Crisis more
than homeowners, consumer enforcement action focused far more
on helping homeowners than tenants.
Part II will examine why consumer protection agencies do not,
in practice, fully incorporate tenants into their mandates. Section
II.A will discuss jurisprudential barriers to more robust agency enforcement of tenants’ rights. This Section will also serve as an excuse to survey the case law on whether tenants are “consumers”
under UDAP laws, an area largely overlooked by recent scholarship. Section II.B will discuss underlying sociological factors behind consumer agency under-prioritization of tenants. And Section
II.C will analyze original interviews conducted with consumer enforcement bureaus to identify institutional barriers to these agencies fully incorporating tenants into their mandates. Part III will
then discuss why robust public enforcement of tenants’ rights is essential to protecting tenants, just as it is essential to protecting traditional consumers. Finally, Part IV will propose specific reforms to
better empower consumer enforcement agencies to protect tenantconsumers. The Article then concludes and suggests areas for future scholarship.
I. THE FORMATION OF THE CURRENT CONSUMER AND
TENANT PROTECTION REGIMES
In articulating the lack of parity between tenants and other consumers, it is important to examine the modern history of governmental efforts to protect consumers and tenants, respectively. Over
approximately the last half-century, the consumer protection
movement has twice generated an acute flourishing of regulatory
consumer protection efforts: in the 1960s and 1970s and in the
33
wake of the Financial Crisis of the 2000s.
Tenant gains since the 1960s have been predicated on the notion that tenants are “consumers” and should thus receive con33. Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State and Private Enforcement of
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Law, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 912 (2017); James H. Backman, The Tenant as a Consumer—A Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law and in Landlord/Tenant Law, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1980); Chamallas, supra note 29, at 10–16; see also
Mary A. Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503,
510 (1982).

674

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 54:3

34

sumer protections. Still, in essential ways, the gains achieved by
consumers have generally not been fully extended to tenants. In
large part, this is because consumers of credit and tangible goods
have received a great deal of attention from consumer protection
agencies, while tenants have not.
A. Consumer Gains in the 1960s and 1970s
To understand the historical context of the early tenants’ rights
movement, a brief discussion of the concurrent consumer rights
movement is necessary. The wave of consumer activism in the
1960s and 1970s “coincided generally with the more liberal political climate of the 1960s and the movements for social equality that
escalated in the late 1960s and early 1970s,” as well as with social
35
uprisings inspired in large part by consumer grievances.
Like previous consumer movements, this movement focused on
36
“manipulative advertising and the existence of unsafe products.”
Unlike past movements, this wave centered around a call for more
37
direct government enforcement of individual consumer rights.
Historically, for example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
focused on antitrust activity. But in the 1970s, the FTC shifted its
38
focus to protecting individual consumers. States, in turn, enacted
“mini-FTC,” or UDAP, laws, all of which granted enforcement
39
power to a state agency. Federal UDAP laws and their state corol40
laries became the primary statutes used to protect consumers.
Under UDAP laws, the delegated enforcement agency generally
has broad discretion, not only to sue businesses for wrongdoing,
but also to issue pre-litigation subpoenas, induce businesses to enter into binding promises to not engage in certain acts, and re41
quest broad and sometimes preemptive equitable relief. Indeed,

34. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075–79 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
35. Chamallas, supra note 29, at 17–18; Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the ‘Law of the Poor,’ 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1425–26 (2014).
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 17–18 (“[W]hat marked out this era from earlier bursts of energy . . . was the
presence of Ralph Nader and his organization’s impact on the federal government.”).
38. See Pridgen, supra note 33, at 911–15.
39. Backman, supra note 33, at 16. The FTC Act does not include a private right of action. At first, state UDAP somewhat followed suit, allowing private litigants only to obtain
injunctive relief, though such acts were then expanded to allow private litigants to sue for
damages. See Pridgen, supra note 33, at 914.
40. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 1.1.
41. See id. § 13.
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since the 1960s, the consumer protection regime has largely relied
42
upon government agencies for enforcement.
Before discussing consumer gains in the 1960s and 1970s, this
subsection will take a brief diversion to discuss the nature of UDAP
laws.
1. A Brief Primer on UDAP Laws
The National Consumer Law Center describes UDAP laws as follows:
All fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the Virgin Islands have enacted at least one statute with
broad applicability to most consumer transactions, aimed at
preventing consumer deception and abuse in the marketplace. Many of these statutes are patterned after the language in Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act that prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” The term “UDAP” is an
43
acronym for this prohibition.
UDAP prohibitions are often phrased in broad and general
terms to enable flexible enforcement and application by agencies
44
and courts. Within the defined scope of trade and commerce,
UDAP laws tend to prohibit the use of “unfair and deceptive acts
45
and practices.” What constitutes a “deceptive” or “unfair” practice
thus warrants brief attention.
Though they are similar in ways, “unfairness” and “deception”
are distinct concepts under UDAP. Deception pertains to what
most would likely consider archetypal examples of consumer fraud:
“[t]he FTC and the CFPB both define deception as a material representation, omission, act, or practice that misleads or is likely to
mislead a consumer whose interpretation is reasonable under the
46
circumstances.”

42. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 42–46. As another example, in 1972, Congress passed
the Consumer Product Safety Act and created the Consumer Product Safety Commission
with authority to create and enforce product safety standards. Consumer Product Safety Act
(CSPA), U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.cpsc.gov/Regulations-Laws—
Standards/Statutes/Summary-List/Consumer-Product-Safet-Act (last visited Feb. 13, 2021).
43. NCLC, supra note 27, § 1.1.
44. Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 478–79 (1974).
45. CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES:
A 50-STATE EVALUATION OF UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES LAWS 1 (2018),
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.
46. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.2.1.
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Unfairness is more of a catchall referring to business practices
which have the propensity to unjustly harm or take advantage of
47
consumers. Instead of strictly defining unfairness, most courts
apply the following factors to determine whether a given practice is
48
unfair: (1) whether the practice offends public policy; (2) whether the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
and (3) whether the practice causes substantial injury to consum49
ers.
Of course, no two UDAP laws are exactly the same. 50 Some pro51
hibit only deception, not unfairness. Others include additional
52
distinct categories such as “abusiveness” or “unconscionability.”
Beyond these broad prohibitions, many UDAP statutes also state
that violations of other enumerated statutes constitute per se
53
UDAP violations. All state UDAP statutes include a private right of
action and also delegate enforcement authority to a state agency,
54
often the Attorney General.
2. The Scope of Consumer Protection Efforts
During the 1960s–70s
With that primer on UDAP out of the way, this Article will now
turn back to the consumer protection movement of the 1960s and
1970s. Consumer gains during this era focused on protecting consumers of tangible products—such as cars, furniture, and widg55
ets—as opposed to real property or financial products. While enforcement of UDAP laws could have been utilized to increase

47. Id. § 4.3.3.1.
48. Id. (suggesting the proper question is whether the practice is “within at least the
penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness”).
49. Id.
50. See generally CARTER, supra note 45.
51. NCLC, supra note 27, at App. A.
52. Id. § 4.3, App. A.
53. Id. § 3.2.2. Notably, while a small number of particularly broad UDAP statutes, like
California’s, declare that any “unlawful” business practice is a UDAP violation, CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017), very few, if any, UDAP laws specifically state that particular
tenant abuses or violations of state tenant-landlord laws constitute per se UDAP violations. See
e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.17 (West 2020); WIS. ADMIN. CODE ATCP § 134.06–.10 (2018).
54. NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.1. The FTC Act and UDAP statute enabling the CFPB do
not allow for a private right of action. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (outlining the CFPB); Schmidt v.
PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 106 F. Supp. 3d 859, 872 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Inst. for Truth in
Mktg. v. Total Health Network Corp., 321 F. Supp. 3d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that
there is no private right of action under FTC Act); see also Cox et al., supra note 29.
55. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3–5
(2008) (noting consumer protection regulation’s focus on ensuring the safety of tangible
products, as opposed to financial products).
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56

protection for tenants, this was seldom the case. Both state and
federal agencies brought extremely few enforcement actions on
57
behalf of tenants even through the 1980s. In fact, courts have interpreted the model UDAP code, drafted in 1970, to indicate that
UDAP laws should not cover tenant-landlord matters:
A consumer transaction typically involves a natural person
who obtains or is solicited to obtain an item of goods, a service, or an intangible primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes. Also included are certain analogous
transactions in which a natural person obtains or is solicited to obtain a business opportunity in which he has not
been previously engaged. In view of the extensive state regulation of securities transactions, their inclusion is left optional. On the assumption that land transactions frequently
are, and should be, regulated by specialized legislation,
58
they are excluded altogether.

56. For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) does not usually pertain to the residential rental market. Eric M. Steven, From Landlord/Tenant to Debt Collector/
Consumer and Back Again—Landlord/Tenant Notice Practice and FDCPA Compliance after Romea,
35 GONZ. L. REV. 175, 177–82 (1999); see also Backman, supra note 33, at 19; Commonwealth
v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 465 (1974) (arguing that the FTC’s regulation of
other rental products indicates its authority to regulate rental housing). But see id. at 493
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting) (noting that FTC regulation of leasing arrangements has always
targeted the leasing of tangible goods, not real estate).
57. See Backman, supra note 33, at 19. The only cases research has turned up during the
1970s and 1980s across all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S. Territories are
those included in Appendix A. Further, besides Isaacs, Lefkowitz, MacFarlane, Abrams, Zimmerman, and Schwab, all of these cases regard mobile home parks. These lawsuits are commendable, especially as those living in mobile homes are often perceived to be particularly
vulnerable. However, mobile home tenants represent a small percentage of American tenants, indicating that application of UDAP to mobile home laws did not evidence a general
trend towards protecting tenants through UDAP Enforcement. Further, in Schwab, the
Court ruled that tenants fall outside the scope of UDAP; in Zimmerman, the court ruled that
the AG did not properly allege a UDAP violation based on the allegation of withholding of
security deposits without additional acts of deception or fraud; the Magley court held that
the AG did not have enforcement power over the specific case; and Bel Fiore held that an
illegal clause in 280 leases did not constitute a problem sufficiently effecting tenants generally to be actionable under UDAP. State v. Anchorage Trailer Sales, Inc., C.A. No. 76-7971,
1977 WL 18408 (Super. Ct. Alaska 1977); State ex rel. MacFarlane v. Boulder Rental Prop.
Ass’n, No. 80 CV 1583, 1981 WL 11409, at *2 (D. Colo. 1981); People ex rel. Fahner v.
Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d 924, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa, 445 N.E.2d
1249, 1250–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. Isaacs, 577 S.W.2d 617,
617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Commonwealth v. Gustafsson, 346 N.E.2d 706, 708 (Mass. 1976);
Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974); State v. Solil Mgmt. Corp., 491
N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Magley, 484 N.Y.S.2d 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984);
State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 408 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Zimmerman v. Nat’l Apartment Leasing Co., 519 A.2d 1050 (Pa. 1986); State v. Schwab, 693 P.
2d 108 (Wash. 1985).
58. UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N. 1970); see,
e.g., Heritage Hills, Ltd. v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio 1990) (citing UNIF.
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Still, despite the regime’s focus on consumers of tangible goods,
the government also took decisive steps to protect consumers of
59
credit. Congress passed broad regulations, such as the Truth in
Lending Act, Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. Each of these statutes includes both a private right of action and delegation of enforcement authority to a
60
federal agency.
Interestingly, while consumer protection agencies paid little attention to residential renters, enhanced legal protections for credit
consumers came largely in response to the practices of rent-to-own
61
furniture stores. Because the arrangements were rent-to-own, policy makers and enforcement agencies viewed the furniture leases as
extensions of credit and the rental payments as installment pay62
ments. Residential tenants, who generally were not renting-to-buy,
63
did not receive the attention of these agencies.
B. Tenant Gains During this Same Era
Still, during the 1970s, tenants also experienced significant legal
gains. 64 These gains, which resulted in tenant-landlord law substantially resembling that in place today, in many ways piggy-backed off
65
of the discourse of the consumer rights movement. Such tenant
gains rested on the notion that tenants are “consumers” and thus
66
require protection from power imbalances favoring businesses. As
discussed in Section I.D, however, tenant gains developed under a
distinct legal regime are often less robust than the consumer pro67
tection regime.
The primary tenant protections defining this era were the war68
ranty of habitability and the prohibition of landlord retaliation.
CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT). Courts, however, have been less willing to read this provision
to exclude homeownership transactions from UDAP. Keiber v. Spicer Constr. Co., 619
N.E.2d 1105, 1108–09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
59. See, e.g., Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968); Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724; Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977).
60. Id.
61. Fleming, supra note 35, at 1416–21.
62. See id. at 1421.
63. Backman, supra note 33, at 19.
64. DOUGLAS BIKLEN, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 131 (1983) (noting that the Civil Rights Movement and the Javins decision, see case cited infra note 79 and
accompanying text, were also integral to catalyzing the tenants’ right movement).
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075–79 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
67. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
68. David A. Super describes the tenant revolution of the 1960s and 70s as follows:
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These protections remain the cornerstone of tenant-landlord law
69
today.
The proliferation of warranty of habitability laws was such a sea
change because it marked an essential departure from the doctrine
70
of caveat lessee. Caveat lessee, the primary legal principle guiding
rental transactions for hundreds of years, dictated that, with some
exceptions, “the lease gave the tenant the property ‘as is’ and the
landlord had no duty to keep the property in a habitable condition
71
or fit for a particular purpose.” Before the warranty of habitability, America largely adhered to a “Sixteenth Century England [doc72
trine which] characterized a lease as a conveyance of property” to
73
be governed by property law as opposed to contract law. As such,
the landlord’s breach of lease did not excuse tenants from abiding
by their duties under the lease; tenants could not withhold rent
74
even if the landlord violated the lease’s express warranties.
But under the warranty of habitability, the landlord had an implied contractual obligation to maintain the property. If the landlord failed to do so, the tenant could seek recourse by withholding
rent and/or using the landlord’s breach as a defense to eviction
75
for failure to pay. The tenant could also sue for contract damag76
es.
The other major achievement of the tenant revolution of the
1960s and 70s was the wide-scale prohibition of retaliatory evic77
tion. In some sense, this prohibition is the cornerstone of tenant
protection law, as tenant rights mean little if landlords can evict
tenants for attempting to enforce them.
Though they did not place tenants on equal footing with other
consumers, increased tenant protections were predicated on rhetoric and policy arguments analogizing tenants to consumers at

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw wide-ranging changes in tenants’
rights . . . The most prominent result of the revolution, however, was reading an
implied warranty of habitability into residential leases, with a corollary prohibition
on evictions in retaliation for asserting these new rights. These measures, eventually adopted in almost every state, seemed to reverse the landlord’s historical
dominance of the landlord-tenant relationship.
Super, supra note 28, at 392–93.
69. See id.
70. See Barbara Jo Smith, Tenants in Search of Parity with Consumers: Creating a Reasonable
Expectations Warranty, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 475, 477 (1994).
71. Id. at 477.
72. Neisser, supra note 16, at 530.
73. Backman, supra note 33, at 1.
74. Smith, supra note 70, at 478.
75. See Super, supra note 28, at 394.
76. See id. at 400–01.
77. See id. at 413–15, 427.
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78

large. Scholars, for example, often credit the D.C. Circuit Court
79
case Javins v. First National Realty Corp. with popularizing the war80
ranty of habitability and eroding caveat lessee. There, a tenant attempted to introduce evidence of the landlord’s housing code vio81
lations as a defense to eviction for failure to pay rent. The trial
court deemed evidence of the code violations inadmissible because, under caveat lessee, the landlord’s code violations did not ex82
cuse the tenant’s rent obligation.
In reversing this decision, the Javins appellate court clarified
that courts have typically used “the special rules governing real
property to resolve controversies” since a lease was, at least tradi83
tionally, a “conveyance of an interest in land.” Reversing the district court, the D.C. Circuit held that “a warranty of habitability . . .
is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling
84
units . . . .”
The court specifically observed that while, in agrarian times,
tenants were often interested primarily in renting a piece of land
for agricultural purposes, “when American city dwellers . . . seek
‘shelter’ today, they seek a well-known package of goods and ser85
vices . . . .” Drawing on consumer warranty law, the court specifi86
cally argued that tenants should be protected as consumers. This
decision served as the jurisprudential underpinning to this paradigm shift in tenants’ rights. The warranty of habitability, along
with other laws protecting tenants, quickly proliferated throughout
87
the states.
Still, the regime resulting from the Tenant Revolution was based
on doctrines and enforcement practices distinct from those protecting consumers at-large. As discussed, while UDAP laws offer a
88
broad array of available relief, tenant-landlord law is largely de-

78. See Neisser, supra note 16, at 546–48 (discussing that early courts recognizing the
warranty of habitability did so on the basis that modern tenants require consumer protections).
79. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
80. Smith, supra note 70, at 483.
81. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
82. Id. at 1073–74.
83. Id. at 1074.
84. Id. at 1072–73.
85. Id. at 1074.
86. Id. at 1077–79 (“[W]e believe that the consumer protection cases discussed above
require that the old rule be abandoned in order to bring residential landlord-tenant law
into harmony with the principles on which those cases rest.”).
87. This history is well-documented within several other articles quoted here and need
not be repeated at length. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 29, at 10–19; Robert M. Mayer, The
US Consumer Movement: A New Era Amid Old Challenges, 46 J. CONSUMER AFFS. (SPECIAL ISSUE)
171 (2012).
88. NCLC, supra note 27, §§ 1.1–1.2.
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signed to enable tenants to withhold rent in a defensive posture.
90
While contract damages may be available, these are likely small.
Private attorneys have little incentive to represent tenants in litiga91
tion against landlords. While enforcement agencies play a large
role in protecting the rights of consumers of tangible goods and
financial products, tenant protections largely depend on private,
92
often pro se, enforcement. As such, tenant and consumer protections each flourished during the 1970s but did so along different
trajectories, to the detriment of tenants.
C. Consumer Protection Activity from Reagan to Present
With the election of Ronald Reagan and resurgence of free
market ideology, the progress of the consumer protection movement greatly slowed. 93 Indeed, “[b]y the 1980 election of Ronald
Reagan . . . the third wave of consumer activism was dead and
94
would remain dormant for the next twenty years,” though this is
95
perhaps a bit more true at the federal level than the state level.
The Financial Crisis of 2007 spurred the next major wave of consumer protection advances, which focused on the regulation of
96
consumer credit. The Crisis, which burgeoned into a global economic meltdown, was largely caused by the collapse of the U.S.
97
subprime mortgage market. There are any number of dueling
narratives used to explain the Crisis, but the basic story is that the
housing bubble burst and brought the U.S. housing market, and
98
then the world economy, with it. Then, due to this economic
downturn and the resulting spike in unemployment and decrease
in property values, America was hit by a second wave of foreclo99
sures beginning in 2010.
89. See Super, supra note 28, at 389, 407.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See infra Section III.C.
93. See Chamallas, supra note 29, at 19.
94. Id.
95. Pridgen, supra note 33, at 911–15.
96. Building the CFPB, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/data-research/research-reports/building-the-cfpb/ [https://perma.cc/ZAN3LRPA]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY J., Summer 2007,
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/F3ANED5B].
97. John V. Duca, Subprime Mortgage Crisis: 2007-2010, FED. RSRV.: HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/subprime_mortgage_crisis.
98. Id.
99. The 2010 Foreclosure Crisis may be discussed as distinct from the 2007 Financial
Crisis, but for the purposes of this article, they are part of the same narrative. See id.; Kathleen M. Howley, Prime U.S. Mortgage Foreclosures Increase to Record, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2010,
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In their essential 2008 article, “Making Credit Safer,” thenProfessor Elizabeth Warren and Professor Oren Bar-Gill framed
what would become the regulatory response to the financial crisis:
Credit products, like mortgage loans and credit cards . . .
are left largely unregulated . . . . Because financial products
are analyzed through a contract paradigm rather than a
products paradigm, consumers have been left with unsafe
credit products. These dangerous products can lead to financial distress, bankruptcy, and foreclosure, and, as evidenced by the recent subprime crisis, they can have devas100
tating effects on communities and on the economy.
The article provided the ethical and economic underpinnings of
a new wave of consumer protection focusing on consumer credit
regulation. The article argued that, along with the regulation of
tangible consumer products, consumer protection should focus on
ensuring the financial safety of consumers of credit. As argued by
Warren and Bar-Gill:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance
of bursting into flames and burning down your house. But
it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage
that has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family
out on the street—and the mortgage won’t even carry a
disclosure of that fact to the homeowner . . . . Why are consumers safe when they purchase tangible consumer products with cash, but when they sign up for routine financial
products like mortgages and credit cards they are left at the
101
mercy of their creditors?
Warren and Bar-Gill specifically argued for the establishment of
a federal agency to regulate mortgages and other consumer credit
102
products. It did not take long for this to become a reality. In
2010, with a new wave of foreclosures hitting the United States,

12:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-18/prime-u-s-mortgageforeclosures-rise-to-record-on-unemployment-pressure [https://perma.cc/V8DV-X2AD]. As
illustrated by these sources, the crisis from 2007–2010 was fueled by defaults on subprime
loans, while 2010 marked a spike in defaults on prime loans.
100. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 1.
101. Warren, supra note 96. Importantly, as discussed, before Dodd-Frank and the CFPB,
there was a great deal of regulation protecting consumers of credit, but credit consumers
were still not protected as much as consumers of tangible goods just as, today, consumers of
rental housing enjoy less protection than consumers of credit or tangible goods. See supra
Part II.
102. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 98–100.
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Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. The
following year, Congress founded the CFPB, delegating them
broad enforcement power over Dodd-Frank and empowering them
104
to enforce Dodd-Frank’s general UDAP prohibitions. Shortly
thereafter, state attorneys general teamed up with federal regulators to bring a multitude of UDAP litigation against major mort105
gage services for their malfeasance surrounding the crash. Thus,
in response to the financial crisis, Congress established a broad
new consumer regulatory framework and a new independent
agency to enforce it. State and federal agencies pursued high profile enforcement actions against mortgage servicers.
D. These Gains Have Not Been Fully Extended to Renters
The regulatory effort to protect homeowners in response to the
Foreclosure Crisis was far more robust than that aimed at protecting renters, despite the fact that the Crisis likely hurt renters more
than homeowners. 106 Indeed, approximately forty percent of fami107
lies displaced by foreclosures during the Crisis were renters. This
does not account for renters displaced from properties zoned as
108
owner-occupied. More importantly, it does not account for the
additional displacement of renters from job loss, rent hikes, and
the conversion and demolition of rental properties taking place

103. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
104. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 96.
105. See What Was the National Mortgage Settlement?, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May
10, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-was-the-national-mortgagesettlement-en-2071 [https://perma.cc/V7T9-83RX].
106. David Lurie, Rental Home Sweet Home: The Disparate Impact Solution for Renters Evicted
from Residential Foreclosures, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 247 (2016) (“Less attention has been
paid to the of the foreclosure crisis on renters, who by some estimations constitute 40% of
all Americans displaced by foreclosure.”); Steven T. Hasty, Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure by
Funding Needed Repairs, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 581, 593–94 (2012); Carsten Grellmann, Why State
Courts May Prove Most Effective at Allowing the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act to Protect Tenants, 20 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 295, 297–98 (2011) (noting deficiencies in
the PTFA, such as the fact that there is no enforcement mechanism beyond tenants using it
as a defense to eviction).
107. SHAMBHAVI MANGLIK, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., RENTERS IN FORECLOSURE:
A FRESH LOOK AT AN ONGOING PROBLEM XI (2012), http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files
/Renters_in_Foreclosure_2012.pdf; Lurie, supra note 106, at 247. While not all foreclosures
end in displacement, to get a sense of the scope of the problem, “[b]etween 2006 and 2014,
nearly 10 million homeowners in America saw the foreclosure sale of their own homes,”
which indicates that at least 40 million rental households likely saw foreclosure, though this
may not account for foreclosure of larger multiunit rental properties. Viktoria Ney, Many
Americans Ended up Homeless During the Real Estate Crisis 10 Years Ago— Here’s Where They Are
Now (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-where-those-who-lost-homesduring-the-us-housing-crisis-are-now-2018-8.
108. See MANGLIK, supra note 107, at 5.
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109

due to the Foreclosure Crisis. Further, the crisis for renters both
predates the Foreclosure Crisis and has continued even years after
110
111
it ended. Having faced several decades of an affordability crisis,
renters remain largely reliant on the legal regime put in place in
112
the 1970s. As with the foreclosure crisis, this rental crisis is not
113
merely one of affordability, but also of consumer abuse. These
abuses, in turn, exacerbate affordability issues and result in serious
114
negative externalities for families, communities, and society.
Tenants, however, have not reaped the full benefit of consumer
protection reforms occurring in the wake of the Financial Crisis.
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB’s regulatory power applies only to
115
the sale of “financial products,” like mortgages. Renting a house
does not involve an extension of credit so these enhanced protec116
tions do not apply to tenants. Similarly, the FTC, with some ex117
ceptions, rarely takes action to protect tenants.
In 2009, Congress did pass the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA), which, in many circumstances, obligates purchasers of foreclosed properties to respect the existing leases of tenants
118
in the property. But, like most laws protecting tenants, the Act

109. Danilo Pelletiere & Keith Wardrip, Renters and the Housing Credit Crisis, POVERTY &
RACE RSCH. ACTION COUNCIL, https://prrac.org/renters-and-the-housing-credit-crisis (focusing on renters directly displaced due to foreclosures as opposed to other negative externalities of the housing crisis).
110. See JCHS 2019, supra note 2, at 2–3; JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 4–6; Carey L.
Biron, Why Unaffordable Rental Housing May Be New Normal in the US, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2020/0131/Whyunaffordable-rental-housing-may-be-new-normal-in-the-US [https://perma.cc/ZG33-AYU5]
(“The price of rental properties has risen by 150% between 2010 and 2020, and it may continue to rise, according to a new Harvard study. The nation’s lowest-income renters are feeling the brunt of the housing crisis.”).
111. Richardson, supra note 1.
112. See generally Super, supra note 28 (discussing the formation of this regime in the
context of later reforms).
113. See supra Part I; Super, supra note 28, at 405; supra notes 18–20 and accompanying
text.
114. David Brancaccio & Katie Long, Millions of Americans Are Evicted Every Year — and Not
Just in Big Cities, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.marketplace.org/2018/04/09/
eviction-desmond-princeton-housing-crisis-rent [https://perma.cc/H6TM-3QGZ].
115. See Dodd-Frank: Title X - Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, L. INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/dodd-frank_title_x_-_bureau_of_consumer_financial_
protection (last visited Jan. 23, 2021).
116. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 313–14 (observing that while the CFPB may be wellsituated to enforce the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, protecting tenants is outside
of the CFPB’s jurisdiction).
117. See infra Appendix B. Most of the Federal suits protecting tenants are Fair Housing
lawsuits, which are vital but are not ‘tenant-protection suits’ in the context of this article, as
they focus upon the disparate treatment of some groups of tenants. See, e.g., Complaint, FTC
v. Apartment Hunters, Inc., No. 8:18-CV-1636 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2018), 2018 WL 9815931.
118. Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, div. A. tit. VII, §
701, 123 Stat. 1633, 1660.
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119

relies on private enforcement. The only way the law can be raised
is as a defense to eviction—and there are serious doubts about its
120
efficacy. Congress took little other action to help tenants, failing
to even properly fund federal housing subsidies to keep up with in121
flation.
State enforcement agencies also have not prioritized the protection of tenants since the Foreclosure Crisis. This is perhaps best
exemplified by the terms of the consent judgments entered into
122
between state enforcement agencies and mortgage servicers. In
the wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, state attorneys general, often in
concert with federal agencies, entered into several multistate na123
These settlements consisted of
tional mortgage settlements.
elaborate consent judgments, providing penalties for servicers, relief for consumers, and requiring servicers to institute extensive
124
policy initiatives and reforms. Notably, these consent judgments
mandate reforms that reach far broader than the servicer conduct
125
underlying the litigation.
Settlements with mortgage servicers could have also included
126
broad relief for renters. Because the vast majority of foreclosed
homes were repurchased by the foreclosing lenders, the Crisis led
to mortgage servicers becoming the landlords for tenants still re127
siding in foreclosed properties. Despite widespread reports of

119. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297.
120. Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297–98 (noting deficiencies in the PTFA, such as the
fact that there is no enforcement mechanism beyond tenants using it as a defense to eviction).
121. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING:
EXPANDING OPTIONS FOR A DIVERSE AND GROWING DEMAND 6 (2015), https://www.jchs.
harvard.edu/sites/default/files/media/imp/America%27s%20Rental%20Housing%202015
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4FN-EVTC].
122. As federal agencies were also generally party to these consents, the substance of
them is also reflective of the federal government’s approach. See generally JOINT STATEFEDERAL NAT’L MORTGAGE SERVICING SETTLEMENTS [hereinafter NMS], http://www.
nationalmortgagesettlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZYS2-ZHKU]; Settlement Documents,
JOINT STATE-FEDERAL NAT’L MORTGAGE SERVICING SETTLEMENTS, http://www.national
mortgagesettlement.com/settlement-documents.html [https://perma.cc/E2KL-9VWS].
123. Press Release, DOJ, Federal Government and State Attorneys General Reach $25
Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing
and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federalgovernment-and-state-attorneys-general-reach-25-billion-agreement-five-largest; see Settlement
Documents, supra note 122.
124. Settlement Documents, supra note 122; see, e.g., Consent Judgment, United States v.
Bank of Am. Corp., 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012).
125. Id.
126. See Grellmann, supra note 106, at 295 (noting that foreclosing lenders often take
possession of the property and thus bear responsibility for remaining tenants under the
PTFA).
127. Janet Portman, Rights of Renters in Foreclosure, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/renters-foreclosure-what-are-their-30064.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
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tenant abuse in foreclosed properties, however, these consent
128
judgments included little help for renters.
129
Taking one such consent judgment as an example, in the 130130
page general settlement, there are only two items dedicated to
protecting tenants in foreclosure, and both of them do only slightly more than tell mortgage servicers to follow the law. One provision obligates servicers to follow the law and to put policies in
131
place to ensure they follow the law. Another section empowers
the Settlement Monitor to assess servicer treatment of tenants. 132 If
the Monitor finds that the servicers are unreasonably injuring tenants, the Monitor may include compliance metrics assessing treat133
ment of tenants. These metrics may not go beyond assessing servicer compliance with existing law, though, and no new tenant
134
protections are included.
That said, in recent years, state consumer enforcement agencies
have increasingly taken action to protect tenants, though there is
135
little aggregated data on the matter. There is reason to believe,
though, that consumer fraud bureaus do not fully incorporate tenants into their mandates. One strong, though imprecise, indicator
comes from the National Attorneys General Training and Research
Institute database, a database of attorney general lawsuits, which
only active attorneys general can access. A search by administrators
uncovered a total of only four hits using the search terms “tenant”
136
or “landlord.”
Further, research indicates that, as of July 2019, twenty-six states
137
had never brought an enforcement action to protect tenants.

128. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361RMC, at A-40, E-9, E-25 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012); see also Settlement Documents, supra note 122.
129. Though the other consent judgments are not materially different in this regard. See
Settlement Documents, supra note 122.
130. Consent Judgment, United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC
(D.DC. 2012). This includes the settlement through Exhibit A.
131. Id. at A-40 (“Tenants’ Rights. 1. Servicer shall comply with all applicable state and
federal laws governing the rights of tenants living in foreclosed residential properties. 2.
Servicer shall develop and implement written policies and procedures to ensure compliance
with such laws.”).
132. Id. at E-8–E-9.
133. Id.
134. Id. at E-9.
135. One article aggregated the types of consumer lawsuits brought by state attorneys
general in 2014, but, perhaps tellingly, in quantifying the industries targeted in these lawsuits, the authors did not code for tenant-landlord cases. Cox et al., supra note 29; see also Email from Prentiss Cox, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to Author (Aug. 19, 2019)
(on file with author).
136. E-mail from Emily Myers, Antitrust Counsel, Nat’l Att’ys Gen. Training & Rsch. Inst.
to Author (Apr. 1, 2019).
137. See infra Appendix A. This chart is based on original research attempting to chart all
tenant-related state civil enforcement actions, excluding fair housing/discrimination cases,
through July 2019. Research methods involved searching on Westlaw and state consumer
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While there has been a recent uptick of tenant enforcement efforts, they have been primarily concentrated within New York, District of Columbia, Delaware, Maryland, and Massachusetts, and
138
thus do not indicate a national trend. Further, some states that
took a particularly active role in mortgage servicing litigation have
not extended such efforts to protect tenants reeling from the
139
Housing Crisis.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE STATUS QUO
The question then becomes: Why, in practice, don’t consumer
protection agencies fully integrate tenants into their mandates?
“Consumer enforcement agencies,” in this context, refers to state
consumer protection bureaus, which are usually a subdivision of
the Attorney General’s Office, as well as federal agencies like the
140
FTC and CFPB.
This Article focuses on state consumer protection agencies because these seem to be the agencies best situated and most likely to
141
protect tenants. After all, integral to the Tenant Revolution of
the 1970s was the view that tenants are consumers in need of con142
sumer protection. Likewise, this Article focuses on consumer enforcement agencies’ application of UDAP laws, as these laws pro-

protection agency websites for lists of actions brought on behalf of tenants. Common search
terms included: attorney general; consumer protection; tenant!; State ex rel.; People ex rel.;
and landlord. The Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws site was also searched for press releases from the last 12 months, then the web page for
each relevant state office was visited to see if there were any additional press releases or cases
mentioned, and a web search was done for new cases related to tenants and consumer protection in each state.
138. Id.
139. Iowa, for example, has brought few lawsuits on behalf of tenants, see infra Appendix A, but led a multistate coalition of state consumer enforcement bureaus in mortgage
servicer “Robosigning litigation,” one of civil law enforcement’s most prominent responses
to the Foreclosure Crisis. See State Attorneys General Are the New Bank Regulators, AM. BANKER
(Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/state-attorneys-general-are-thenew-bank-regulators; see also Carole Fleck, $25 Billion Deal Reached to Aid Distressed Homeowners, AARP (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.aarp.org/money/credit-loans-debt/info-022012/robo-signed-foreclosures.html.
140. The CFPB’s jurisdiction, however, generally does not extend to the residential rental market, and tenants do not seem to turn to the FTC for help. See generally FTC, CONSUMER
SENTINEL NETWORK, DATA BOOK 2019, at 7 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-2019/consumer_sentinel_
network_data_book_2019.pdf .
141. This is not, however, meant to be a nominal point. This Article discusses infra that
tenants need protection from consumer enforcement agencies. This Article takes no stance
on whether this should be done through existing agencies or whether new agencies should
be established to specifically focus on tenant issues.
142. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 467–68, 477–80 (1974).
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vide consumer protection agencies with their primary mandates. It
also bears mention, however, that other enforcement agencies
143
have not filled this gap.
There are three primary explanations for the seeming hesitance
of these delegated agencies to employ UDAP laws to protect tenants: statutory/jurisdictional explanations, sociological explanations, and institutional explanations.
Section II.A discusses statutory/jurisdictional explanations, i.e.,
instances where UDAP statutes explicitly exclude the protection of
tenants or where courts have interpreted them to do so. Section
II.B then discusses sociological explanations for tenants’ lack of
parity with other consumers. This Section focuses on the overarching social and political structures that make it less likely for government institutions to prioritize renters.
Finally, Section II.C discusses institutional explanations, as expressed by the agencies themselves. To learn more about consumer agencies’ attitudes and approaches to protecting tenants, the
author interviewed representatives from ten state consumer fraud
144
bureaus. Of course, this does not constitute a statistically significant sample, and this Article does not claim to be a quantitative
analysis. Rather, these interviews are used to offer qualitative insights into consumer protection bureaus’ approaches to tenant
protection.
A. Statutory/Jurisdictional Explanations
While it is not the case in most states, a significant minority of
state UDAP statutes exclude tenants. 145 The scope of commerce
146
regulated by UDAP varies by state. A prototypical UDAP statute
may, for example, prohibit the use of unfair or deceptive practices
within the scope of trade and commerce, where commerce is defined as the “advertising, selling, and leasing of goods and ser147
vices.” Some UDAP statutes exclude or include specific transac148
tions within their scope, such as real property transactions.
UDAP statutes also often exempt certain specific industries, com149
monly the utility industry, for example. UDAP laws may also ex-

143. See infra Appendix A; Grellmann, supra note 106, at 297.
144. See infra Section II.C.
145. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2; Susan L. Thomas, Annotation, Coverage of Leases Under State Consumer Protection Statutes, 89 A.L.R. 4th 854 (1991).
146. Thomas, supra note 145.
147. See NCLC, supra note 27, at App. A.
148. See id.
149. See id. § 2.3.
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clude from coverage practices otherwise permitted by law, i.e.,
150
practices sanctioned by other more industry-specific regulations.
In some instances, UDAP statutory language is seemingly explicit about the inclusion or exclusion of tenant issues; statutory text,
151
however, is not always determinative. For example, leasing of real
property is specifically included within the scope of “trade and
commerce” covered by Michigan’s UDAP law, but at least one
court has excluded such coverage on the basis that state tenant152
landlord law displaces UDAP’s application. Similarly, while Maryland’s UDAP law explicitly prohibits “the use of any unfair, abusive,
or deceptive trade practice . . . in . . . [t]he . . . lease . . . of . . . consumer realty,” courts have significantly limited the protections the
153
law offers to tenants.
It should also be noted that reading a UDAP statute to either include or exclude tenants is not necessarily determinative of whether that state’s consumer protection bureau will use UDAP to protect tenants. For example, several Florida cases hold that Florida’s
154
UDAP statute applies to protect tenants, but Florida’s state consumer protection agencies have brought few, if any, UDAP en-

150. See id. § 2.3.3.3. Section 2.3.3.1 summarizes the mainstream approach to such exclusions: Certain UDAP statutes exclude from UDAP coverage only practices “permitted” by law
or “authorized” by a regulatory agency. This language exempts far fewer practices than statutes using the term “regulated,” since a practice may be remedied by the UDAP statute
where there is an insufficient showing that the particular challenged activity is specifically
permitted or authorized by law.
To claim this type of exemption, “a defendant must show more than the mere existence of a related or even overlapping regulatory scheme that covers the transaction. Rather,
a defendant must show that such scheme affirmatively permits the practice which is alleged
to be unfair or deceptive . . . .” Conduct is not specifically authorized by an agency merely
because it has not been specifically prohibited.
151. For example, see discussion of the CFPB’s jurisdiction, text accompanying supra
note 115. See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-505(d)(iv)–(v) (2007) (mandatory security freezes
imposed by Wyoming’s UDAP law on credit reporting agencies do not apply to tenant
screenings); State v. De Anza Corp., 416 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
exclusion of real estate transactions from previous version of statute as basis for excluding
tenant-landlord issues from current statute). Though the inclusion of “real estate” in the
definition of covered “trade or commerce” does appear to be an indicator that courts will
read the statute as covering tenants more than the statute’s inclusion of “lease” transactions
without specifically including real estate transactions. See, e.g., infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text (discussing Hawai’i jurisprudence).
152. See Davis v. Boydell Dev. Co., No. 16-011635-CZ, 2019 WL 2605789, at *5 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 25, 2019).
153. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-303 (West 2018); NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.1; see
also, e.g., Scroggins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Md. 1994) (“We do not believe the legislature intended the CPA to be applicable to statements or omissions concerning the leased
premises occurring during the term of the lease.”) (quoting Richwind v. Brunson, 645 A.2d
1147, 1158 (Md. 1994)).
154. See Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. PNR, Inc., 890 So. 2d 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So. 2d 773 (Fla. 2003); Equity Residential Props.
Tr. v. Yates, 910 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Wright v. Emory, 41 So. 3d 290 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. 2010).
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155

forcement actions targeting tenant abuse. On the other hand,
New York courts have significantly limited UDAP’s application to
tenant-landlord matters, but New York employs UDAP to protect
156
tenants far more actively than any other state. Still, for obvious
reasons, if a state’s UDAP law excludes tenants, that state’s consumer protection agency is significantly less likely to take action to
157
protect tenants.
Courts limit the application of UDAP laws to tenants generally
on one of two grounds: either tenant-landlord matters are not
within the scope of “trade or commerce” covered by UDAP laws, or
the state’s tenant-landlord laws displace UDAP as applied to tenant-landlord-issues. These will be discussed in turn.
1. ‘Tenant-Landlord’ Transactions Fall Outside the Scope of
Regulated Trade or Commerce
There are three primary bases on which courts deem tenantlandlord transactions to fall beyond the scope of trade and commerce under UDAP. The first, and most common, is that rental
transactions are not “trade or commerce” because they are a subset
of real estate transactions. The second is that, in the residential
rental context, UDAP applies only to points of sale, as opposed to
the ongoing tenant-landlord relationship. The third is that tenantlandlord issues are private conflicts outside of UDAP’s scope.

155. See infra Appendix A.
156. Under New York’s UDAP statute, consumers must not only prove individual injury
but also that the conduct in question affects consumers more generally. Courts thus limit
UDAP’s application to tenant issues on the basis that the conduct in question was not “consumer-oriented conduct aimed at the public at large.” Aguaiza v. Vantage Props., LLC, 893
N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010). As such, a number of New York decisions categorize
seemingly systemic tenant issues as not sufficiently “consumer-oriented” to fall within the
scope of UDAP. See, e.g., State v. Bel Fior Hotel, 425 N.Y.S.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)
(“We do not believe the provisions of a damage deposit clause in each of the 280 separate
but identical contracts can be fairly be called ‘repeated’ or ‘persistent’ within the meaning
of the statute.”); see also State v. Magley, 484 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[W]e
are unable to conclude that Special Term abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s request for an injunction . . . enjoining respondents from commencing proceedings to evict
tenants not offered a one year lease . . . . Special term concluded under the circumstances of
this particular case, injunctive relief was not appropriate since the legal and/or factual issues
differed as to the various tenants and, therefore, could be better resolved in separate proceedings to which the tenants would be parties.”) Notably, in Magley, the court is specifically
limiting the reach of the state in enforcing UDAP, stating that the conduct the state seeks to
address would be better addressed through individual private lawsuits.
157. See infra Appendix A.
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a. Residential Leasing Does Not Involve the Exchange of Goods or Services
Several courts restrict UDAP laws’ application to tenant-landlord
relationships on the basis that real estate transactions, or transactions centered around the conveyance of real property, fall outside
158
the scope of trade and commerce covered by UDAP. The model
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act somewhat endorses this ap159
proach. Such a stance evokes the historically prominent view,
largely abandoned by scholars, that tenant-landlord matters should
be adjudicated under “the special rules governing real property”
160
conveyances, rather than the laws regulating commerce.
Hawai’i’s jurisprudence on the matter exemplifies this ap161
proach. Hawai’i’s UDAP statute affords standing only to “consumers” and defines a consumer, in relevant part, as “a natural
person who primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
purchases, attempts to purchase, or is solicited to purchase goods
162
or services . . . .” “Purchase” is read to encompass “contract to
163
buy,” “lease” and “contract to lease.”
In Fernandez v. Mark Development, Inc., the court questioned
whether rental housing is a “good” and/or “service.” 164 Concluding
that it is neither, the court deferred to the historically dominant
view of renting underlying caveat lessee—that rental transactions are
165
“real property” transactions, not “consumer” transactions. Again,
to fall within the scope of regulated commerce, the transaction
166
must involve either the sale of “goods” or “services.”

158. See Thomas, supra note 145, § 3[c]; see NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2.1.
159. See UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1970)
(specifically recommending that real estate transactions be excluded from UDAP coverage,
though on the basis that they are more appropriately regulated by separate real estatespecific laws, thus demonstrating the futility in disentangling the rationales on which courts
limit UDAP’s application to tenant matters).
160. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
161. See Souza v. Fisher, CAAP-12-0001699, 2017 WL 1293657, at *6–7 (Haw. Ct. App.
Apr. 2, 2017) (citing Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 905 P.2d 29, 41 (Haw. 1995); Fernandez v. Mark Dev. Inc., No. 29331, 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
2011)).
162. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 480-1, 480-13(b)(1) (2020). In addition, Hawai’i’s UDAP includes, in its definition of a consumer, one “who commits money, property, or services in a
personal investment.” Id. § 480-1. Interestingly, Hawai’i courts interpret UDAP to encompass
home purchases because buying a house is a “personal investment,” while renting a house,
according to these courts, is not. This distinction exemplifies the narrow, and often disadvantageous, space tenants occupy under UDAP. Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Ct. App.
2011).
163. Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808, at *1.
164. 2011 WL 5089808, at *2.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *1.
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167

To define “goods,” the court looked to Hawai’i’s Uniform
168
Commercial Code (UCC), which defines “goods” as tangible
items: “all things (including specially manufactured goods) which
are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale . . . .” Because this definition seemingly does not include real
property, the court held that rental transactions do not involve the
169
purchase of goods.
In evaluating whether renting property involves purchasing a
“service,” the court stressed that the conveyance of property does
not involve purchasing services: “The rental of real property ‘involve[s] the transfer of a possessory interest in the real property for
a period of time, in exchange of payment’ ” and the “rental
agreement is a transfer of real property for a specified term, not a
170
‘service’ under” UDAP. Interestingly, some courts appear more
willing to apply the “real property” exemption to rental transac171
tions than transactions surrounding homeownership.
Other courts exclude tenants based on expressio unius est exclusio
alterius—the canon of interpretation that the inclusion of one
172
thing implies the exclusion of another. In Roberson v. Southwood
Manor Associates, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court held
UDAP does not apply to rental transactions, in part because the
UDAP law, in enumerating per se violations, does not include vio173
lations of tenant-landlord law. Though the court conceded that
the referenced list is non-exhaustive, it interpreted the exclusion of
tenant-landlord/real property from the enumerations as indicative
174
of legislative intent.
Such reasoning illustrates a contrasting approach between
courts who hold UDAP applicable to tenants and those who do
not. The “not-apply” courts are more likely to apply strict constructionist modes of interpretation, relying on the narrow and tech175
nical definition of terms. The “apply” courts, in contrast, interpret UDAPs’ scope as broad and flexible, focusing more on the
176
policy behind UDAP than strict textualism. As stated by one such
167. Id. at *2.
168. Id. (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 480-13(b)(1)).
169. Id.
170. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
171. See Fernandez, 2011 WL 5089808; Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977).
Compare, e.g., Keiber v. Spicer Constr. Co., 619 N.E.2d 1105, 1108–09 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)
(home construction contract regulated by Ohio’s UDAP), with Heritage Hills v. Deacon 551
N.E.2d 125, 128 (Ohio 1990) (tenant-landlord matters excluded from Ohio’s UDAP).
172. See, e.g., Roberson v. Southwood Manor Assocs., LLC, 249 P.3d 1059, 1060–61
(Alaska 2011).
173. Id. at 1063.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., id.
176. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 477–480 (1974).
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court, “it is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices . . . . Even if all known practices were specifically pro177
hibited, it would be at once necessary to begin over again.”
b. Tenant-Landlord Matters Are Not Sufficiently Transactional to
Fall Within UDAP
Courts may limit UDAP law application to tenant-landlord matters that take place within the on-going tenant-landlord relationship and instead only apply UDAP to points of sale. Multiple Maryland decisions, for example, hold that UDAP does not regulate
178
habitability concerns arising after lease formation. In Scroggins v.
Dahne, a tenant sued her landlord under Maryland’s UDAP law, arguing that the landlord committed an illegal trade practice by
179
renting her an apartment with peeling lead paint. At least in
part, however, because the paint began to peel after lease formation, the court ruled UDAP inapplicable:
[In Richwind,] [w]e held instead that [t]he CPA applies to a
lease at the time the consumer enters into it, and the Act is
intended to govern deceptive trade practices which induce
the prospective tenant to enter into such a lease . . . . As the
chipping or peeling paint did not exist at the time the lease
was entered into, the landlord could not be said to have
180
engaged in a deceptive trade practice under the CPA.
Tellingly, while Maryland is more active than most states in using
UDAP to protect tenants, Maryland’s consumer enforcement suits
focus on discrete deceptive transactions—the charging of illegal
fees, the illegal withholding of security deposits, and the like—
181
rather than, for example, ongoing habitability concerns.

177. Id. at 463 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142 (1914)).
178. Scroggins v. Dahne, 645 A.2d 1160, 1164 (citing Richwind Joint Venture 4 v.
Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147 (1994), overruled by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.,
835 A.2d 616 (Md. 2003)). By overruling Richwind, Brooks seems to overrule Scroggins in
principle.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 696 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
181. See infra Appendix A (citing Stacey J. Hawkins v. Reg’l Mgmt., Inc., No. 2550 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. Jan. 19, 2018)); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen. Attorney General Frosh Sues
Landlords for Defrauding Rental Applicants (Apr. 18, 2016); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen.,
Attorney General Frosh Announces Settlement With Homes Direct, Inc. (June 22, 2006);
Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler: Developer of Unbuilt Retirement Community for
Veterans in Baltimore Co. Must Reimburse Deposits to Applicants (June 3, 2014); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler Announces Settlement With Property Manager (Sept. 26,
2013); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., AG Gansler’s Consumer Protection Division Settles
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A federal district court, interpreting Illinois’s UDAP law, was
even more explicit in holding that incidents within an ongoing
tenant-landlord relationship are not part of regulated trade or
182
commerce. While Illinois’s UDAP law generally applies to tenant183
landlord matters, the court held it did not apply to an allegedly
illegal eviction because the “eviction of Plaintiff was not ‘advertising,’ ‘offering for sale,’ ‘sale,’ or ‘distribution,’ and thus did not
184
qualify as trade or commerce under the Act.” Such reasoning
tends not to entirely foreclose UDAP’s application to tenant matters, but rather limit it to discrete transaction points.
c. Tenant-Landlord Issues Are Private Matters, Not “Consumer” Matters
Courts may also limit UDAP’s application to tenant matters on
the basis that tenant-landlord issues are too localized or private to
truly exist within trade or commerce. In some such cases, courts
merely analyze whether UDAP applies, for example, to disputes between roommates, a distinct scenario which will not be further discussed here. 185
Charges of Fabricated Damage Claims Against Prince George’s Co. Apartment Owner (Mar.
21, 2012); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Gansler Settles with Property
Management Company: JPI Apartment Management Agrees to Stop Charging Certain Fees
(Oct. 16, 2008); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Settles with Three Property
Management Companies (Feb. 6, 2007); Press Release, Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney General
Settles with Property Management Company: Associated Estates Realty Corporation Agrees
to Stop Charging Certain Fees (Jan. 26, 2007).
182. Falk v. Perez, 973 F.Supp.2d 850, 868 (N.D. Ill. 2013).
183. See e.g., Anast v. Commonwealth Apartments, 956 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt., Inc., 542 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Carter v.
Mueller, 457 N.E.2d 1335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Testa, 445 N.E.2d
1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People ex rel. Fahner v. Hedrich, 438 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982). See also Brown v. Veile, 555 N.E.2d 1227, 1231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
184. Falk, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (quoting 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/1(f)). Falk,
however, may not actually deter Illinois’s Consumer Fraud Bureau from bringing UDAP
claims to challenge illegal evictions. Illinois brought and successfully settled one of the
higher profile UDAP claims on behalf of tenants. Press Release, Illinois Att’y Gen., Madigan
Announces $1 Million Settlement with Safeguard Properties (June 3, 2015),
https://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015_06/20150603.html [https://perma.cc
/9VAD-EBH3].
That said, other states may be hesitant to bring UDAP tenant-protection actions based
on activity that sounds less in classic deception. See Simpson v. Yonts, 197 Ga. App. 311
(1990) (holding that landlord’s failure to repair fuse box does not rise to the level of and
unfair or deceptive act even if it constitutes a breach of landlord’s duty to repair); Pelleteri
v. Caspian Grp., Inc., 851 So. 2d 1230, 1241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2003); McCormack v. Brower,
948 A.2d 1259 (Me. 2008); Simpson v. Young, 153 N.H. 471 (2006).
185. Billings v. Wilson, 493 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 1986); Sayah v. Hatzipetro, 492 N.E.2d
1131 (Mass. 1986); Neihaus v. Maxwell, 766 N.E.2d 556 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); Young v.
Patukonis, 506 N.E.2d 1164 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). See also NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.3,
n.1130 (collecting cases). While these instances are not central to this article, it does bear
mentioning that it would be somewhat anomalous for a consumer fraud bureau not to pursue action against a landlord because the landlord runs only a small operation, as data sug-
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Other decisions, however, limit the application of UDAP to ten186
ant matters in more pertinent ways. According to some such decisions, the tenant-landlord relationship is presumptively private, as
187
opposed to being part of the regulated marketplace. Multiple
188
New York courts have taken this view. In one case, for example, a
New York court characterized tenant accusations of a larger landlord’s allegedly widespread efforts to force tenants to prematurely
leave the property as “only private disputes between landlords and
tenants, and not consumer-oriented conduct aimed at the public at
189
large, as required by statute.”
2. Tenant-Landlord Law Displaces UDAP as Applied to Tenants
Another commonly cited basis for courts to restrict UDAP’s application to tenants is that tenant matters are governed by a separate set of laws which, according to such courts, displace UDAP’s
application to tenant-landlord matters. The commentary to the
Uniform UDAP statute adopts this view: “On the assumption that
land transactions frequently are, and should be, regulated by specialized legislation, they are excluded altogether.” 190
The notion that tenant-landlord law displaces UDAP is based in
a broad application of the principle that conduct cannot violate
UDAP where it is sanctioned by more specific laws. In most states,
courts read this exemption narrowly: if a more specific statute explicitly permits certain conduct, UDAP cannot be read to prohibit
191
such conduct. Other courts, however, read this exemption quite
broadly: if an industry is subject to a specific regulatory scheme,
then businesses within that industry are categorically exempt from

gests consumer fraud bureaus most frequently bring actions against small operations. Cox et
al., supra note 29, at 61–62. That said, a landlord running a small operation for profit is distinct from a homeowner renting to a roommate. But see PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt.,
842 So.2d 773 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]hen considered with the other provisions of the FDUTPA
[Florida’s UDAP], it is clear that the prohibition is broad enough to protect against instances of unfair or deceptive conduct as to a single party or under a single transaction or contract . . . . The very provisions that outline the parameters for individual remedies under the
FDUTPA are triggered by the commission of a single act.”). Though, again, it is exceedingly
unlikely that an enforcement agency would target or even know about such isolated instances.
186. NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.2.6.
187. Id.
188. See cases cited supra note 156.
189. Aguaiza v. Vantage Props., LLC, 893 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
190. Heritage Hills v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio 1990) (quoting UNIF.
CONSUMER SALES PRACS. ACT § 2(1) cmt. (1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N. 1970).
191. NCLC, supra note 27, § 2.3.3.1.
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192

UDAP. Again, the specific language of the UDAP statute is not
193
necessarily outcome determinative.
Heritage Hills v. Deacon exemplifies how courts may broadly apply
this exemption to exclude tenant-landlord matters from UDAP
194
coverage. There, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether
lease clauses seemingly abrogating the landlord’s duty to make re195
pairs violate UDAP. To answer this question, the court analyzed
whether Ohio’s UDAP statute applies to tenant-landlord matters at
196
all, and concluded it does not. Importantly, the court cited no
exemption of otherwise regulated conduct within the text of
Ohio’s UDAP and conceded that “the Act does not specifically ex197
clude a lease of real property.” Still, the court argued that the
tenant-landlord code should displace UDAP in regulating tenantlandlord matters:
This specific statutory scheme for resolving landlord-tenant
disputes would appear to exclude application of [UDAP] to
residential leases . . . . Clearly, the Consumer Protection Act
covers a very broad area of transactions; whereas, the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act covers one very specific
small area of transactions, and is complete within itself for
that area. We therefore must conclude that for all transactions within its purview the Residential Landlord and Ten198
ant Act controls and preempts the field.
Such cases illustrate the narrow space tenant-consumers are
forced to occupy under state regulatory regimes. Indeed, in many
instances, when an industry is regulated by a separate regulatory
scheme, there is a state or federal agency who enforces that
scheme. Tenants are excluded from UDAP enforcement because
they are regulated by another set of laws, but there is generally no
199
state or federal agency tasked with enforcing those laws. In this
200
sense, tenants neither have their cake nor eat it.
192. Id.
193. Compare Heritage Hills, 551 N.E.2d at 127 (excluding tenant-landlord matters without citing UDAP provision exempting transactions permitted by other laws), with, e.g.,
Carter v. Mueller, 120 Ill.App.3d 314 (1983) (interpreting Illinois’s UDAP to apply to tenant-landlord matter though Illinois UDAP contains no such explicit language).
194. Heritage Hills, 551 N.E.2d at 127.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 127–28.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 128 (quoting Chelsea Plaza Homes v. Moore, 601 P.2d 1100, 1104 (Kan.
1979)).
199. Nathan Tempey, The Case for Licensing Landlords, GOTHAMIST (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://gothamist.com/news/the-case-for-licensing-landlords
[https://perma.cc/V47RNVGG]; Frasier Sherman, Can I Buy Houses Then Rent Them Out Without a Real Estate License?,
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In Davis, for example, the Michigan Appellate Court upheld the
trial court’s decision excluding tenants from UDAP coverage based
upon Michigan’s regulated industries exemption which excludes
from coverage “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized
under laws administered by a regulatory board or officer acting
201
under statutory authority of this state or the United States.” The
problem is no state or federal board or agency regulates Michigan
landlords; rather, the court relies on Michigan’s home rule struc202
ture, which empowers counties to regulate landlords. As a result,
in Michigan, the state consumer protection agency cannot protect
tenants, as they are excluded from UDAP coverage, but there is no
state agency taking their place, leaving tenants in a regulatory no
203
man’s land.
Further, unless they are based upon explicit statutory language,
decisions like the Ohio court’s are hard to square with UDAP’s
general prohibition of “unfair” conduct: violation of public policy
204
205
is a key factor in determining unfairness. In states like Ohio,
violations of tenant-landlord law are seemingly exempt from UDAP
for the exact reason such conduct is “unfair” under UDAP—
206
because it violates public policy. It is similarly counterintuitive for
business conduct to be exempt from UDAP coverage because it is
207
illegal. Regardless, several jurisdictions exclude tenants from
UDAP on this basis.

LEGALBEAGLE.COM, https://legalbeagle.com/13593692-can-i-buy-houses-then-rent-them-outwithout-a-real-estate-license.html [https://perma.cc/ERB8-L3SC]. Contrast to, for example,
the roofing industry which, in many states, is regulated by a specific licensing board, as well
as local inspectors and permit boards. Contractor Licensing Requirements – State by State, HOME
ADVISOR (2019), https://www.homeadvisor.com/r/state-by-state-licensing-requirements/
[https://perma.cc/H39P-BUVN.].
200. Compare Davis v. Boydell Dev. Co., Inc., No. 16-011635-CZ, 2019 WL 2605789, at *4
(Mich. Ct. App. June 25, 2019) (per curiam) (excluding tenants from UDAP coverage based
on Michigan’s regulated industries exemption), with 49 Prospect Street Tenants Ass’n v.
Sheva Gardens, Inc., 547 A.2d 1134 (N.J. 1988) (distinguishing inclusion of tenant-landlord
matters in UDAP with exclusion of securities matters on the partial basis that securities matters are overseen by a specifically delegated regulatory agency).
201. See Davis, 2019 WL 265789, at *4.
202. See id. (noting that Michigan leaves the regulation of landlord licensing to municipalities).
203. See id.
204. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
205. Ohio’s UDAP statute prohibits both deceptive and unfair practices and defers to
FTC guidance and definitions. OHIO REG. CODE 1345.02. The FTC, like most states, includes
violation of public policy as a factor in determining statutory unfairness. NCLC, supra note
27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
206. NCLC, supra note 27, § 4.3.3.3.1.
207. In Conaway v. Prestia, for example, the Superior Court of Connecticut, relying on
the FTC guidance treating violation of public policy as a factor is assessing unfairness, held
that a landlord committed an unfair act by violating legal licensing requirements but collecting rent anyway. 464 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1983). The court stressed the landlord’s violation of
other regulations made the conduct more, not less, likely to be unfair under UDAP. Ex-
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B. Sociological Explanations
Consumer enforcement agencies’ approach to tenant issues re208
flects the greater social structures in which these agencies exist.
Tenants, as a demographic, have less power and resources than
209
other consumer classes—for example, homeowners. Less power210
ful groups tend to receive less attention from the government.
This is not to say that individuals at consumer enforcement agencies have any disregard for tenants. Rather, it applies a basic principle of much sociological thought—that individual institutions re211
flect the larger social structures in which they are situated. This
principle helps explain, for example, why code enforcement is so
212
chronically underfunded.
Indeed, one would expect tenants to receive less consumer
agency attention, especially compared to their homeowning counterparts. Compared to homeowners, tenants have significantly less
213
214
money, are members of age demographics less likely to vote,

panding on Conaway, in Gaylord v. Mosher, the court held that a landlord committed statutory unfairness by locking tenants out of their home, in violation of the state’s landlord-tenant
ordinance. 1991 WL 253709, at *3 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1991). Again, citing FTC guidance, the
court stated that “[t]hese violations offended public policy and therefore constituted a
CUTPA [Connecticut’s UDAP Statute] violation.” Id.
208. Kathryn Sabbeth, (Under)Enforcement of Poor Tenants Rights, 27 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L.
& POL’Y 97, 130–31 (2019) (“The underenforcement of housing standards is a classic case of
‘underenforcement’ on behalf of communities that have not been a political priority . . . .
[P]oor people do not enjoy law enforcement resources in proportion to their numbers in
the population . . . . Underenforcement is ‘a form of social disinvestment’ . . . . State and
federal actors equipped with more resources could pursue certain categories of housing
conditions enforcement, but, perhaps for the same reasons that the local agencies are under-resourced, the better-funded government units have devoted relatively little attention to
the concerns of poor tenants.”). This social disinvestment is not an accusation of mal-intent
against agency employees and leaders, but rather a statement about the sociological forces
necessarily reflected in a society’s institutions.
209. Homeowners vs Renters Statistics, IPROPERTY MGMT. (Feb. 2020), https://iproperty
management.com/renters-vs-homeowners-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/3696-ATWX].
210. Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130.
211. See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE
THEORY OF STRUCTURATION xxiii–xxvi (1984).
212. Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130.
213. Quick Facts: Resident Demographics, NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL,
https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/quick-facts-figures/quick-facts-residentdemographics (click “U.S. Household Incomes”) (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
214. Renters are younger than homeowners and older demographics are more likely to
vote. See Jordan Misra, Voter Turnout Rates Among All Voting Age and Major Racial and Ethnic
Groups Were Higher Than in 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/04/behind-2018-united-states-midtermelection-turnout.html [https://perma.cc/KQ9P-TB4T]; Quick Facts: Resident Demographics,
NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, https://www.nmhc.org/research-insight/quick-factsfigures/quick-facts-resident-demographics (click “Renters and Owners”) (last visited Feb. 5,
2021) (noting that tenants are younger than homeowners).
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and have a much higher rate of transience. Tenant issues also
have a disproportionate effect on socially disadvantaged groups
216
such as racial minorities and women. In Evicted, Desmond documents how Black women likely experienced the brunt of the rental
217
crisis. Thus, though the rental crisis has been worse than the
218
foreclosure crisis, and the foreclosure crisis was worse for renters
219
than homeowners, it is no surprise that homeowners receive
more attention than renters.
Such inequities are likely reproduced in the structure of con220
sumer enforcement agencies themselves. Most agencies rely on
consumer complaints, thus disadvantaging vulnerable tenants fearing retaliation or those with less technological access to the com221
plaint process. Problems homeowners face with mortgage banks
likely stem from the standardized practices of large institutions,
which make it more difficult to aggregate tenant issues for en222
forcement purposes.
Further, differences between mortgage-lending and rental institutions may make it more difficult for bureaus to bring enforcement actions against the latter. Indeed, it is no surprise that more
vulnerable populations do business with smaller and less visible entities, which are, in turn, more difficult for the government to hold
accountable. For example, it is easier for landlords to dodge enforcement than it is for, say, Bank of America. Absentee landlords
may be hard for law enforcement to locate or take meaningful action against. There are no absentee mortgage banks. Similarly, for
215. Compare IPROPERTY MGMT., supra note 209 (noting that 54% of rental households
turnover from year to year), with Stephanie Booth, Should I Sell My House? 6 Signs It’s Time to
Move On, REALTOR.COM (July 10, 2019), https://www.realtor.com/advice/sell/how-longshould-you-live-in-your-home-before-selling [https://perma.cc/95KQ-JDCW] (stating average homeowners stays in home for 10 years).
216. Terrence McCoy, Eviction Isn’t Just About Poverty. It’s Also About Race — and Virginia
Proves It, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/local/social-issues/eviction-isnt-just-about-poverty-its-also-about-race—and-virginia-provesit/2018/11/10/475be8ae-d7bd-11e8-aeb7-ddcad4a0a54e_story.html
[https://perma.cc
/G78G-PPPE]; DESMOND, supra note 24, at 98.
217. Id.
218. Supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. These class differences between tenants and homeowners also manifest themselves
through the jurisprudence and statutory language just discussed in Section II.A. See, e.g.,
Fernandez v. Mark Dev., 2011 WL 5089808, at *2 (Haw. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2011). For example, in Fernandez, the Hawai’i appellate court held that because Hawai’i’s UDAP protects
personal investments but not real property transactions, rental transactions fall outside
UDAP, though home sales do not. Id.
221. See DESMOND, supra note 24, at 186-–192 (noting, for example, that tenants facing
domestic violence forego calling the police for fear of alerting the landlord to the disturbance and facing eviction).
222. See, e.g., Complaint at *51, United States v. Bank of Am., 12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C.
2012), http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/files/Complaint_Corrected_2012-0314.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TPF-HMRT].
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obvious reasons, it is less likely for mortgage banks to be judgment
proof than small-time landlords. While mortgage banks are by no
means a paragon of trustworthiness and accountability, at least
consumer fraud bureaus can find them and collect from them.
Thus, consumer enforcement agencies are less likely to respond
strongly to the crises affecting tenants than those affecting homeowners because tenant vulnerability is less noticeable and harder to
enforce. Indeed, tenants have faced severe affordability problems
223
on and off since World War II. While this crisis has spiked in recent years, it is not new for tenants to face frequent hardship. On
the other hand, homeowners’ widespread default on mortgages
224
was shocking, sudden, and, therefore, far more noticeable. The
invention and popularity of mortgage-backed securities stemmed
from the common sentiment of: “Who the hell doesn’t pay their
225
mortgage”? As such, it is easier for agencies to view the Foreclosure Crisis as a “crisis” in the true sense—a sharp and damaging
deviation from the norm. It is easier for the plight of low-income
tenants to fly beneath the radar.
C. Institutional Factors
To better understand why consumer protection agencies do not
treat tenant protection as central to their mandates, the author interviewed representatives from ten state consumer protection bureaus. 226 Importantly, this Article does not purport to be a quantitative study. The author spoke to the bureaus to get better insight
into the range of institutional factors and norms influencing agen227
cy treatment of tenant matters.

223. See Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 459 Pa. 450 (1974).
224. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 4 (Jan.
27,
2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H7TJ-D7CK].
225. Cezary Podkul, The Regrets of Lewis Ranieri, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-regrets-of-lewis-ranieri-1536240610
[https://perma.cc
/7K3W-FBLY]; Paramount, The Big Short Opening Scene, YOUTUBE (2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JDjjsCunnhI.
226. Representatives from the consumer financial protection bureaus of the following
states were interviewed: Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, Idaho, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Connecticut, Arkansas, Vermont, and Indiana. There was no exact science to the states interviewed for this article, as much of it depended on which states were willing to participate.
The interviews tended to focus on states that brought few if any enforcement actions regarding tenant issues, did not have clear jurisprudence excluding tenants from UDAP, and had a
relatively high ratio of complaints regarding tenant landlord issues based on their published
lists, though, in some instances, the interviews themselves cast some doubt on the applicability of these criteria.
227. Analysis of the interviews begins with premise that the agencies interviewed do not
prioritize tenant protection in their enforcement efforts. This does not necessarily reflect
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In speaking to these individuals, most acknowledged that their
offices do not often bring enforcement actions aimed at protecting
228
tenants. They provided the following rationales: (1) Common
tenant issues are not transactional in nature or are not core ‘consumer’ issues; (2) Matter regulated by another entity and/or set of
laws and/or other resources available; and (3) Lack of actionable
consumer complaints from tenants.
In many ways, these rationales parallel judicial rationales for limiting UDAP’s application to tenants—that real estate issues are not
consumer issues, that landlord-tenant law displaces UDAP, and
that tenant-landlord issues are private disputes and, thus, do not
truly exist within the stream of commerce as regulated by UDAP.
That said, consumer bureaus were less likely to frame these issues
in jurisprudential terms and more likely to discuss them as logisti229
cal impediments. These factors will be discussed in turn below.
1. Tenant-Landlord Issues Are Not Core Consumer Issues
In some instances, interviewees indicated that tenants’ issues
were not core “consumer” issues, at least not of the type central to
the agency’s mandate.
One manifestation of this view is that the primary mandate of
consumer bureaus is to police the market for scams—
misrepresentations which generally take place at a transaction
point—rather than to regulate the on-going relationship between
tenant and landlord. One representative, for example, stated that
while the office may take on tenant cases that more closely resemble classic scams, for example, where the landlord advertises amenities that are not actually present:

the view of those interviewed but is, rather, based upon the small number of lawsuits or official settlements regarding tenant-landlord matters. See infra Appendix A.
228. Two other factors which received very brief attention from a small number of offices were the notion that consumer bureau regulation of landlords could have adverse market
consequences for tenants (“[C]onsumer bureau intervention would result in landlords behaving as follows: Yep, we’re gonna make all these fixes. And you know what, our rent’s going to go up.”) and fear of making bad law (noting that office makes non-litigation efforts to
help tenants and noting that a court decision could strip them of authority to do so:
“[M]aybe we’ve never brought a seminal case because we just want to keep our power as
is.”).
229. For example, one representative stated that their office was unlikely to get involved
in habitability matters regulated by housing codes, not because, as a matter of statutory interpretation, these codes displaced UDAP, but because it was a more efficient division of
labor for code enforcement to handle such matters. See Interview with Daniel Mosteller,
Special Deputy Att’y Gen., N.C. Dep’t Just. Consumer Prot. Div., at 20:20 (Aug. 9, 2019)
[hereinafter North Carolina Interview] (on file with author).
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[I]f it’s landlord harassment, that’s not going to meet our
standards, because there’s not going to be a misrepresentation or omission . . . . So [changes] in lease terms . . . don’t
really meet our standards, unless there’s some misrepresentation that is being made along with it, and it relates to the
transaction itself. It’s all centered around the actual trans230
action.
This same representative stated that the office was also less likely
to cover habitability issues because such issues did not revolve
around “deceptive statements . . . . And . . . if those aren’t . . . present, we would have difficulty bringing an enforcement action
231
within our office.” This view was stated perhaps most bluntly by a
representative from another state office: “[Tenant-landlord is] definitely not the core of what [the state UDAP statute] is meant to
232
be.”
The just-quoted office elaborated that their priorities were informed by the enumerated industries listed in the UDAP statute
233
they enforced. This office noted that the enumerated list of industries the office could regulate under UDAP was not exhaus234
tive. Still, when asked whether there was “a particular hesitance
or logistical impediment” to the office being more active on tenants issues, the office responded “I think you just look at the statute . . . . So if I take a look at the index, it shows what is core to the
CPA. We get assistive technology, lead and children’s product safety, musical performances, fair credit reporting, credit card compa235
nies, structured settlements, unlicensed loans.”
Somewhat in contrast to the approach expressed above—that
classic deception takes place at transaction points—some offices
stated that tenant-landlord matters more resemble contract disputes than consumer fraud. As one deputy attorney general explained, if a tenant-landlord complaint alleges deceptive or misleading conduct or an unfair business practice, “it might fall under
236
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.” Such complaints, accord-

230. Interview with Betsy DeNardi, Dir. Consumer Prot. Div, Off. Ind. Att’y Gen. Consumer Prot. Div., at 9:56 (July 31, 2019) [hereinafter Indiana Interview] (on file with author).
231. Id.
232. See Interview with Emp., Vt. Off. Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit (July 23, 2019)
[hereinafter Vermont Interview] (on file with author).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Interview with Stephanie N. Guyon, Deputy Att’y Gen., Idaho Att’y Gen. Off. (July
18, 2019) [hereinafter Idaho Interview] (on file with author). This somewhat inverts the
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ing to the Deputy Attorney General, usually involve misrepresenta237
tions in a rental advertisement. In contrast, other tenant-landlord
complaints raise issues governed by “the lease agreement,” which is
“subject to traditional contract law adjudication,” not the Idaho
238
Consumer Protection Act. In other words, “simply because you
don’t perform the way your contract requires you to perform
doesn’t mean that you’re engaging in an unfair or deceptive prac239
tice.” Under this approach, “consumer protections” are more
likely to serve as a backstop for matters not addressed by contract.
To summarize, agencies may be hesitant to prioritize tenant issues because they are not “core” consumer issues. This can be expressed as a political-linguistic point—that many tenant-landlord
issues are not encompassed by the commonly held interpretation
of “consumer fraud.” It can also be understood as expressing an
underlying concern regarding administrative overreach—that the
agency should impose limits on the scope of its regulation based
on industries enumerated in the statute, even if such enumerations
are not exhaustive. An underlying assumption of this rationale may
be that it is inefficient for consumer bureaus to dedicate significant
resources towards tenant issues when other resources exist specifically to help tenants. How resource allocation plays into such
agency decisions will be discussed in the following subsection.
2. Tenant-Landlord Matters Regulated Through Separate
Mechanisms/Concerns of Resource Allocation
As discussed in Section II.A.2, courts limiting UDAP application
to tenant-landlord issues often do so on the basis that UDAP laws
are displaced by specific tenant-landlord codes. Consumer agencies may adopt a similar view, but one founded more on concerns
about resource allocation and logistics. Consumer agencies may be
hesitant to prioritize tenant-landlord issues because other resources are available to tenants. For example, there is a distinct
tenant-landlord statutory scheme and eviction process, government
agencies exist specifically to help tenants, and Legal Aid tradition240
ally allocates significant resources toward eviction prevention.

notion that consumer issues are transactional, as some issues are not truly ‘consumer’ issues
because they are governed by private transactions, not general consumer concerns.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See Suggested List of Priorities for LSC Recipients, LEGAL SERV. CORP. (May 20, 1996),
https://www.lsc.gov/suggested-list-priorities-lsc-recipients [https://perma.cc/CKP6-8HYZ].
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Paralleling the reasoning in the above subsection, some state
consumer enforcement attorneys expressed that their bureaus’
lack of specifically enumerated authority to enforce tenantlandlord law indicates that they may not, or should not, prioritize
tenant issues. As noted by a representative of one bureau in explaining why they brought few tenant-protection suits, “Well, we’re
241
not specifically referenced in the Landlord Tenant Act.”
Another office takes its cues from the fact that tenant-landlord
laws exist as part of a statutory scheme distinct from that which the
consumer protection bureau enforces. A deputy attorney general
with the office further explained that “even though leasing and
renting” is a business practice that falls within the Consumer Protection Act, leasing and renting issues specific to the tenantlandlord relationship are covered under the state’s tenant-landlord
242
laws, which the office does not enforce.
Some offices stated that, because tenants are protected by distinct statutory regimes and have other resources available, it is a
more efficient division of labor for other entities to focus on helping tenants: “We’re not code enforcement . . . . They can deal with
243
[tenant issues] in a lot quicker timeline.” As stated by a representative of one bureau in explaining why the office seldom
244
brought enforcement actions regarding tenant-landlord issues:
Because there’s the Department of Housing, because
there’s housing court, because there’s the Department of
Economic and Community Development, because there’s
Section Eight and the local entities that service Section
Eight, because there are other entities that actually service
housing concerns. And we’re not operationally set up for
these cases, because we wouldn’t be bringing the case on
behalf of a tenant when tenants are usually calling. They
want something now, something’s gone wrong in their
property, their landlord is acting a certain way. And they
want the problem fixed, either, you know, abated rent, or
to take better care of the property no matter what it is.
241. Interview with Kelly Rainsford, Deputy of Regul. Enf’t, S.C. Dep’t of Consumer Affs.
(Aug. 8, 2019) [hereinafter South Carolina Interview] (on file with author).
242. Idaho Interview supra note 236. Notably, some agencies cited court decisions outside of the tenant-landlord context towards the principle that their office was not permitted
to “bootstrap” violation of other laws as a basis for a UDAP violation unless specifically enumerated by UDAP. See, e.g., Interview with Benjamin E. Bellus, Assistant Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Div., Iowa Att’y Gen. Off. (Aug. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Iowa Interview] (on file with
author).
243. North Carolina Interview, supra note 229.
244. Interview with Julianne Avalone, Legal Dir., State of Conn., Dep’t of Consumer
Prot. (July 25, 2019) [hereinafter Connecticut Interview] (on file with author).
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They’re usually calling and the city or some other state
agency that specializes in housing, that can mediate on
their behalf, or resolve the issue directly with the landlord.
As you know, whether it’s often the city coming out and
taking care of the blight and then putting a lien on the
property; whatever that is we don’t have that immediate
remedy.
Some representatives even stated quite explicitly that hesitance
245
to prioritize tenant issues is “primarily a resource issue.” One attorney noted candidly that if the office prioritized tenant issues, it
“could open a floodgate and we don’t have the resources . . . . I
would be doing nothing else [but tenant issues] and would still fall
246
behind.” Indeed, evictions and the like are so prevalent that they
are regulated by a distinct legal regime and subject to a unique
court procedure. If consumer bureaus prioritized such matters, the
thinking goes, it would fundamentally alter their mission such that
they could no longer afford to take action against traditional
scams. According to those espousing this line of reasoning, such a
shift in mission would be inefficient, especially where code enforcement, HUD, and Legal Aid are already tasked with assisting
tenants.
3. Lack of Tenant Complaints
Perhaps more than any other single factor, consumer protection
attorneys cited lack of actionable tenant complaints as the reason
their bureaus do not bring more enforcement actions on behalf of
247
tenants. One state agency, for example, received only eight com248
plaints from 2014 through Summer 2019. The representative of
this bureau recalled, for example, that in one instance, they received a media report of a landlord renting to students who would
illegally increase rent at the last minute, but the office did not take
enforcement action because it received no complaints from the

245. Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
246. Id.
247. Interview with Katharyn Barron, Mich. Dep’t Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Div. (July
29, 2019) [hereinafter Michigan Interview] (on file with author) (“The biggest reason relative to a lack of enforcement in that area is we don’t see a lot of complaints.”).
248. South Carolina Interview, supra note 241. As discussed elsewhere in this article,
however, even where there is a quantitatively small number of tenant complaints, this may
be a reflection of office structure as much as tenant desire to file complaints. For example,
this office representative stated, “We don’t get a lot of . . . landlord-tenant complaints . . .
partly because they might call ahead of time and . . . tell us what the issue is . . . and we refer
them before they ever . . . file an actual complaint with us.” Id.
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249

aggrieved consumers. A representative of another bureau sought
to explain the low quantity of tenant complaints by inferring that
even if the agency considered tenant issues to be core consumer
issues, tenants themselves would not intuitively think to turn to a
consumer agency: “[I]t’s possible that people don’t realize they
could bring their complaints to the Attorney General’s office . . . .
[P]eople think about coming to our office when . . . they’ve been
scammed and not for something that they think . . . isn’t . . . a scam
250
[like if] they’re frustrated with . . . [their] landlords.”
More commonly, though, representatives noted that it was the
quality, not quantity, of tenant complaints that limited the agency’s
ability to bring enforcement actions. After all, tenant complaints
are one of the most common complaints to consumer enforce251
ment bureaus. Several bureau representatives noted that they receive many complaints from tenants, but that such complaints tend
252
to be too individuated to generate escalated enforcement efforts.
Noting that their office took on systemic consumer issues, as opposed to representing individual consumers, one representative
stated that, while they received a significant number of tenant
complaints, tenant issues were often “very individualized and fact
dependent” and thus not “super conducive to the type of cases we
253
bring.” Several bureaus said tenant complaints often constituted
“one-offs.”
Agencies find it more difficult to assist tenants when their complaints appear more intensely fact dependent. It may be difficult,
for example, for a consumer enforcement agency to help tenants
being threatened with illegal eviction; doing so would require the
agency to gage which eviction threats were illegal and to navigate
inevitably conflicting accounts of interactions and transactions between the tenant and landlord.
Representatives of several bureaus noted that, in other industries, a single act of consumer fraud is likely to affect a large num254
ber of consumers in a fairly uniform way. Thus, landlord practic249. Id.
250. Indiana Interview, supra note 230.
251. For example, per annual Consumer Federation of America Surveys, every year,
from 2019 to 2012, landlord-tenant issues were among the top ten issues complained of to
state consumer enforcement bureaus. E.g., CONSUMER FED. OF AM., CONSUMER COMPLAINT
SURVEY REPORT 2019, at 5 (2020), https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07
/Top-Consumer-Complaints-Report-7-27-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2Q2W-DVG8];
CONSUMER FED. OF AM., 2012 CONSUMER COMPLAINT SURVEY REPORT, at 5 (2013),
https://consumerfed.org/pdfs/top-10-consumer-complaints-07-31-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CU7N-NS2E].
252. See, e.g., North Carolina Interview, supra note 229; Michigan Interview, supra note
247; Indiana Interview, supra note 230; Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
253. North Carolina Interview, supra note 229.
254. E.g., id.
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es analogous to traditional “scams”—such as false advertising or
systemic confiscation of security deposits—are more practical for
consumer divisions than ongoing issues faced by tenants over the
255
course of the lease. One bureau representative noted that they
would be more likely to take action if a landlord falsely promised
refrigerators to a complex of tenant units, than if a landlord failed
to complete a number of disparate repairs over a prolonged period
256
of time.
As such, the lack of complaints, the individualized nature of the
complaints, the lack of resources to deal with these seemingly diffuse complaints, and the individualized nature of tenant-landlord
relationships all play important roles in consumer bureaus’ practices towards tenant-consumers.
III. THE NEED FOR INCREASED CONSUMER AGENCY ENFORCEMENT
OF TENANTS’ RIGHTS
There are several reasons why public enforcement of tenants’
rights is necessary. First, as will be discussed in Section III.A, on a
fundamental level, renters should receive the full attention of consumer protection agencies because renters are consumers. Similarly, just as Warren and Bar-Gill noted the inconsistencies in the fact
that agencies regulated tangible goods more than financial products, it is inconsistent for agencies to focus little on the rental industry when they devote significant resources to analogous industries. Section III.B thus argues that enforcement agencies should
afford consumers of rental housing parity with other consumers.
Section III.C argues that, for a variety of reasons, private enforcement cannot adequately regulate the rental industry, and Section
III.D notes that public enforcement and private enforcement serve
distinct goals. Finally, as discussed in Section III.E, achieving a fair
and stable rental market is integral to advancing essential government goals.
A. Consumer Protection Agencies Should Protect Renters Because
Renters Are ‘Consumers’
In his 1980 article “The Tenant As a Consumer?,” James Backman stresses several key similarities between tenants and the arche-

255.
256.

Id.
Michigan Interview, supra note 247.
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257

typal consumer. For example, “[c]onsumer transactions are defined typically as those for ‘personal family or household purposes,’ ” and residential tenants are those who occupy “a structure that
258
is used as a home, residence or sleeping place.” Both traditional
consumers and residential tenants are “characterized in contrast to
259
Modern tenant-landlord
their counterparts in . . . business.”
transactions, like other consumer transactions, are transactional in
260
nature. Further, tenants and traditional consumers both suffer
from a lack of bargaining power and “are typically subject to standard form contracts . . . .” Similarly, both tenants and traditional
consumers suffer the brunt end of the knowledge asymmetry be261
tween themselves and the landlord or supplier. As the landlord
engages in the transaction to turn a profit, the landlord is likely to
262
exploit these asymmetries to the tenant-consumer’s detriment.
Other scholars make a similar argument as a more semantic
263
point. If consumers are purchasers of goods or services, the argument goes, then tenants are “consumers” because tenants pur264
chase housing goods and services.
Others have analogized tenants to other consumers by discussing the principles underlying products liability. As stated by Joan L.
Neisser in her article “The Tenant as Consumer: Applying Strict
Liability Principles to Landlords:”
The public policy supporting strict liability in the landlord
context is compelling . . . . A tenant in an apartment building does not have the control over the common areas or
the resources and expertise to assure that such areas are
reasonably safe. Nor is the tenant in the position to check
that the wiring and heating facilities in the building are
safe. The modern tenant must rely on her landlord to carry
out these responsibilities. . . . An assessment of the realities
of the landlord-tenant relationship also indicates that the

257. Backman, supra note 33, at 3.
258. Id.
259. Backman, supra note 33, at 3; see also Thomas Bothwell, Washington Tenant Remedies
and the Consumer Protection Act, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 559, 559–76 (1975) (arguing tenants should
fall within Washington’s UDAP statute).
260. See Backman, supra note 33, at 1.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Id. at 4.
263. See, e.g., Claude W. Vanderwold, The Tenant as a Consumer, 3 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59
(1971).
264. Id. at 62–63 (“A social and legal trend has begun to protect the consumer of goods.
The tenant is a consumer of housing, i.e., space and services. Since the tenant is a consumer
in his own right and has disabilities similar to those of the consumer of goods, he should be
included within the consumer protection trend and receive the benefits which that trend
has to offer.”)

SPRING 2021]

Protecting Tenants

709

landlord, as owner of the enterprise, is in the best position
to absorb the costs of maintaining the property. The landlord can obtain insurance to protect herself from the impact of liability, and she can raise rent to defray any added
costs encountered in keeping the premises reasonably
265
safe.
Much of the literature on the topic, while still compelling and
relevant, came in the more immediate wake of the 1970s Tenant
Revolution. The rental industry has obviously changed a great deal
266
since then, so an updated look is necessary.
Indeed, especially in recent years, the rental market has been
267
“commoditized.” Advertising and transacting within the residential rental market looks like advertising and transacting within any
other consumer market. Searching for rental housing resembles
any other type of online shopping.
Prospective renters today, for example, tend to find rental housing through online aggregation platforms that use analytics to tai268
lor their advertising to each specific consumer. Advertisements
for rental housing advertise the amenities and services that accom269
pany the unit. Aggregation platforms not only include consumeroriented housing displays but also discount sales and targeted advertisements for third-party provided housing amenities, such as

265. Neisser, supra note 16, at 549–50. Neisser also implicitly makes one of the arguments against treating tenants as consumers—that consumer protection regimes generally
cause costs to be passed on to consumers.
266. See, e.g., Better Business Bureau, Is That Rental Listing Real? A BBB Study of Rental
Scams Involving Apartments, Houses and Vacation Properties, BETTER BUS. BUREAU (Dec. 10,
2019),
https://www.bbb.org/article/news-releases/21033-bbb-investigation-rental-scams
[https://perma.cc/D2JD-JNRC] (noting “millions of scams” regarding false apartment listings and the like). Tenant abuses go well beyond these basic “scams,” but their existence
highlights how the rental market resembles any other market regulators routinely police. Id.
267. Omri Barzilay, Technology Is Finally Changing the Apartment Rental Experience,
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 4, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/04/technology-is-finallychanging-the-apartment-rental-experience [https://perma.cc/9GAQ-TDM9].
268. Id.
269. See, e.g., 1960 Lindsay Ln, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/homedetails/1960Lindsay-Ln-Ann-Arbor-MI-48104/54793391_zpid/ [https://perma.cc/R3PB-SVBB] (noting
that amenities such as washer/dryer come with unit); 212 N 5th Ave,
BACKERSTREETPROPERTIES, http://bakerstreetproperties.rentlinx.com/212-N-5Th-Ave-AnnArbor-MI-48104
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200201223927/http://bakerstreet
properties.rentlinx.com/212-N-5Th-Ave-Ann-Arbor-MI-48104]. This, however, does not necessarily provide a contrast to rental advertising pre-internet. See, e.g., Dan Reed, This 1958 Ad
Shows How Yesterday’s Luxury Apartments Became Today’s Affordable Apartments, GREATER GREAT
WASH. (July 25, 2018), https://ggwash.org/view/64165/this-1958-ad-shows-how-yesterdaysluxury-apartments-became-todays-affordabl [https://perma.cc/3Q7Q-B9J2]. But advertisements for rental housing today are likely far more ubiquitous.
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270

internet services. An advertisement for one home inevitably dis271
plays links to advertisements for similar homes. Aggregation platforms also allow for one-stop shopping of housing and furniture
272
rental.
In some instances, it can be hard to disentangle the aggregation
website from the actual landlord. Aggregation sites like Rezi not
only waive application fees when tenants apply through the site
with participating landlords but also enable tenants to pay their
273
rent online through the Rezi site itself. Bungalow not only aggregates listings, but also adopts and paraphrases the lessors’ representations about these listings: “Move-in ready homes[.] Our
homes are designed to be move-in ready. Think furnished com274
mon areas, super fast wifi, and flexible leases.” Further, at least in
some instances, Bungalow handles ongoing maintenance requests
and the like: “House stuff, handled [.] We coordinate professional
cleanings, call the utility providers for you, and collect rent from
275
your roommates each month.”
Even Craigslist, which was once perhaps analogous to the classified section of a newspaper, is filled with rental company ads which
offer the sorts of deals and specials one would associate with any
276
other consumer product. The aesthetic of rental company websites is often not very different from that of aggregation sites—the
difference is that rental companies are only aggregating their own
277
properties.
As illustrated above, this consumerist approach extends beyond
278
the point of sale. Rental companies, for example, use their websites to simultaneously solicit maintenance requests and advertise

270. See, e.g.,
Medical Center Court Apartments, TRULIA, https://www.trulia.com
/c/mi/ann-arbor/medical-center-court-1005-maiden-ln-ann-arbor-mi-48105—2050038819
[https://perma.cc/QF33-99F4] (“Get up to a MONTH FREE on select apartments!”).
271. See, e.g., 8401 Rockmoor Ridge Road Charlotte, NC 28215, AM. HOMES 4 RENT,
https://www.americanhomes4rent.com/Property/8401-Rockmoor-Ridge-Road-CharlotteNC-28215/8ef29910-2a74-e511-80da-3863bb358df8 [https://perma.cc/GJ9G-75RC].
272. See, e.g., Furniture Rental, CORT, https://www.cort.com/furniture-rental
[https://perma.cc/3949-3MTN].
273. See, e.g., REZI, https://www.rentrezi.com/#!/tenant (last visited Apr. 10, 2021).
274. BUNGALOW, https://bungalow.com/ [https://perma.cc/C4JT-Y9KN].
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., $1,025 / 2br – Dearborn Heights – 2 Br Move in Special *Free 50* Tv at Lease
Signing, CRAIGSLIST, https://detroit.craigslist.org/wyn/apa/d/dearborn-heights-dearbornheights-br/7261822011.html [https://perma.cc/GR43-D3TU].
277. See,
e.g.,
MICH.
RENTAL,
http://michiganrental.rentlinx.com/listings/
type:Apartments [https://perma.cc/3NQ7-7CWT]. Michigan Rental is a relatively small
landlord, with its properties mostly concentrated in Ann Arbor, Michigan, but tellingly, its
aesthetic is very similar to that of rental aggregation cites.
278. See, e.g., Property Management, REINHART REALTORS, https://www.reinhart
realtors.com/property-management/ [https://perma.cc/7BNP-WGC8].
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279

other products. The maintenance request screen itself likely fea280
tures links to other company products. Some rental companies
advertise special repair services and/or other services available for
281
an additional cost. Most fundamentally, rental ads promote the
quality of the apartment and the inclusion of (at least impliedly)
well-functioning amenities.
Residential rental marketing, thus, at the very least, fits squarely
within a consumerist aesthetic; the tenant-landlord relationship involves the same types of advertising, specials, upsells, third-party
contracting, boilerplate terms of use, and the like that leave consumers susceptible to abuses within any other market.
Further, the ongoing nature of the tenant-landlord relationship
blurs the distinction between “scams” that take place at the point
of sale and other less traditional consumer abuses. For example, if
the landlord fails to make repairs of advertised amenities, does that
render these advertisements “false” in a traditional sense? This
question need not be answered. Rather, it simply illustrates that
abuses faced by tenants are analogous to abuses faced by other
consumers. Treating rental markets as unique from other markets
is anachronistic at best.
Still, simply making an analogy between tenants and consumers
generally does not entirely address why consumer enforcement
agencies should fully incorporate tenants into their mandates, a
matter addressed in the following Sections.
B. Consumer Enforcement Agencies Already Focus on Industries
Particularly Analogous to the Rental Industry
The argument that consumer enforcement agencies should protect tenants is that much stronger considering these agencies al282
ready protect other similarly situated consumers. Two particular-

279. See, e.g., J. KELLER PROPS., https://www.jkellerproperties.com/ [https://perma.cc
/C9CP-V3LK].
280. See, e.g., Maintenance Service Requests, INVITATION HOMES, https://www.invitation
homes.com/maintenance-service-requests/ [https://perma.cc/L4S6-MDRH]; Maintenance
Requests, J. KELLER PROPS., https://www.jkellerproperties.com/maintenance-requests-2/
[https://perma.cc/HED5-M24Z].
281. See, e.g., ProCare and Maintenance Requests – Resident Resources, INVITATION HOMES,
https://www.invitationhomes.com/procare/ [https://perma.cc/EU83-F3ZP].
282. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 55, at 3–4. Such an argument again somewhat parallels that employed by Warren and Bar-Gill in arguing for an enforcement agency dedicated
to protecting consumers of financial products. While enforcement agencies had not historically entirely ignored financial product markets, Warren and Bar-Gil argued that consumers
of tangible products were the primary focus of government enforcement, making consumers of financial products an afterthought. However, if financial consumers are analogous in
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ly analogous industries come to mind: the home improvement in283
dustry and the mortgage and mortgage servicing industry.
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that large numbers of consumers already complain to consumer protection agencies about
284
tenant-landlord issues. Thus, tenants have a manifest desire to be
assisted by consumer protection agencies, even while other poten285
tial sources of help exist.
As has been discussed, it is already well-settled practice for consumer protection bureaus to focus their resources on regulating
the home repair and mortgage lending industries. Employing similar logic, enforcement bureaus should consider the protection of
tenants as central to their mandates.
1. Home Repair
Existing data indicates that state consumer protection bureaus
likely file more enforcement claims against the construction and
home repair industry than any other industry. 286 Consumer complaints about home repair contractors are often at or near the top
of consumer protection bureaus’ annual consumer complaints
287
lists.
It is easy to analogize home repair transactions and rental transactions for consumer enforcement purposes. Even if renting a
home is, itself, merely a transfer of property interest, the rental
transaction necessarily implies that the landlord will also provide
ongoing repair services. Landlords advertise the quality of their
apartments and their own quality as landlords. Tenants rent property with the expectation that their landlord will make repairs, and
lease agreements often reflect this expectation. Even if they do not,
288
the warranty of habitability is read into leases by law.
essential ways to consumers already receiving the attention of enforcement agencies, it
stands to reason that financial consumers should as well.
283. Other potentially analogous industries are the timeshare and storage rental industries. The similarities between timeshare consumers and tenants are obvious, especially as
the only difference between timeshare consumers and traditional tenants is the option to
buy at the end of the lease. Similarly, tenants face many of the same problems as consumers
of storage space, yet storage consumers likely receive more attention from consumer agencies. However, there is less data available to gauge the extent to which agencies pursue rentto-buy, timeshare, and storage companies so a comparison is more difficult.
284. For each of the last ten years, complaints about tenant-landlord issues have been
within the top ten categories of consumer complaints to state consumer enforcement bureaus nationwide. See supra note 251.
285. See id. (demonstrating that tenants often make complaints to consumer protection
agencies).
286. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66 tbl.4.
287. See id.
288. Super, supra note 28, at 393.
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As such, even if renting involves a property transaction, the ten289
ant is clearly exchanging money for the landlord’s services. Indeed, tenants literally contract with landlords to provide repair services for the rented property. Thus, as consumer agencies often
pursue enforcement actions against shoddy repair companies, so
too should they pursue landlord and property management companies that fail to properly make repairs or maintain the property.
2. Mortgage and Mortgage Servicing
Examining consumer enforcement activity in the wake of the
foreclosure crisis helps illustrate why such agencies should take
more action to protect tenants. The formation of the CFPB solidified the notion that purchasers of credit, especially mortgages, are
consumers in need of protection from consumer enforcement
agencies. Indeed, the CFPB was formed largely in response to the
290
foreclosure crisis. Further, in the wake of the Crisis, both private
and public UDAP litigation targeting mortgage servicers greatly
291
proliferated. Nearly every state entered into consent judgments
with mortgage banks as part of the National Mortgage Settlements,
regardless of whether these states’ UDAP laws apply to the mort292
gage industry.
Yet, regulation of the rental market is more important than regulation of the mortgage industry. Leases are shorter term than
mortgages, making renters far more vulnerable to displacement.
Property management companies and landlords play a central role
in the day-to-day wellbeing of their tenants, as they are obligated to
make repairs and ensure habitability. Mortgage servicers, on the
other hand, only habitually interact with homeowners in default.
289. See Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1977). In Woods, for example, plaintiffs
brought a claim under UDAP, alleging that defendant seller sold them a home and promised to make any needed repairs, but then failed to make repairs that arose. Id. at 664. The
Texas Supreme court addressed the question of whether plaintiffs were “consumers,” i.e.,
purchasers of good and services, under the UDAP statute. Id. at 666. While the Texas statute
explicitly includes real estate transactions, the court concluded that, even if real estate
transactions are excluded, plaintiffs were still consumers, “[s]ince the builders . . . promised
to repair any defects in the home that arose within the first year, Woods not only purchased
the real property but also, and in addition, the services of the builders . . . .” Woods, 54
S.W.2d at 666–67; see also Fernandez v. Mark Dev., Inc., 262 P.3d 670 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
290. See Megan Slack, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 101: Why We Need a Consumer
Watchdog, WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012, 11:13 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2012/01/04/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-101-why-we-needconsumer-watchdog [https://perma.cc/3CLT-YUQ3]; Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate,
DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/
[https://perma.cc/F3AN-ED5B].
291. See Cox et al., supra note 29, at 38–39.
292. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 38–39; see also NMS, supra note 122.
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Even during times of crisis, this constitutes only a relatively small
293
minority of homeowners. Otherwise, the main job of mortgage
services is simply to process payments and send periodic letters to
294
borrowers. There is, thus, likely potential for more consumer
abuse in the rental context.
Notably, the foreclosure process, like the eviction process, is
295
governed by a distinct statutory scheme in most states, yet consumer fraud agencies still regulate mortgage lenders, as opposed
to treating the foreclosure process as displacing UDAP enforce296
ment. Again, agency protection of tenants is all the more necessary, as the foreclosure process generally provides more protection
than the eviction process, even in states with non-judicial foreclo297
sure processes. As such, it is inconsistent for consumer agencies
to give lower priority to tenants than homeowners.
Further, while there are of course differences between the
mortgage lending industry and rental industry, they are similar in
several relevant ways. Both borrower-lender and tenant-landlord
transactions involve an ongoing relationship where one party is
generally motivated by profit and the other by the desire to establish a stable living situation. The borrower/tenant makes monthly
payments to the lender/landlord each month, but if the borrower/tenant defaults, then the lender/landlord may retake the
home. In many instances, the lender/landlord will report the default to credit reporting agencies or tenant screening agencies
such that the borrower/tenant will have trouble securing high
quality housing in the future. These transactions are thus similarly
high stakes to the consumer—the consumer may lose their home if
they fail to pay.
A possible distinction is that a mortgage involves the selling of a
financial product while a lease involves only the transfer of a real
293. Mortgage Delinquency Rates in the United States from 2000 to 4th Quarter 2020, STATISTA
(Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205959/us-mortage-delinquency-ratessince-1990 (noting that peak rates of delinquency were at 9.3% during the 2007-2010 housing crisis).
294. Mortgage Lenders and Mortgage Servicers, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/whats-difference-between-mortgagelender-and-mortgage-servicer.asp [https://perma.cc/M5QN-6FFY].
295. Amy Loftsgordon, Key Aspects of State Foreclosure Law: 50-State Chart, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/50-state-chart-key-aspects-state-foreclosurelaw.html [https://perma.cc/32EQ-C4MQ].
296. Compare
id.,
with
U.S.
Foreclosure
Laws
by
State,
REALTYTRAC,
https://www.realtytrac.com/real-estate-guides/foreclosure-laws/ [https://perma.cc/9SGXNXQQ].
297. Compare U.S. Foreclosure Laws by State, supra note 296, with Devon Thorsby, Does Your
State Have Fair Eviction Laws?, US NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 1, 2018, 1:03 PM),
https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/slideshows/does-your-state-have-fair-eviction-laws
(state foreclosure processes generally far more lengthy and requiring more stages than state
eviction processes).
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property interest. But such a distinction illustrates its own banality.
The consequences to the borrower/tenant of failing to make the
contractually required payments are closely analogous. Further,
the fact that homeowners, unlike tenants, build equity with each
payment is certainly not a reason to protect tenants less.
Another potentially relevant distinction between tenants and
homeowners is that protecting borrowers is more feasible because
the mortgage-lending market is more concentrated than the rental
market. As will be discussed below, however, the rental industry has
become increasingly concentrated. In fact, that the use of rentalbacked securities is still emergent provides all the more reason for
298
increased regulation of this industry as it is being formed.
Further, that the rental industry may be more diffuse does not
meaningfully distinguish it from the mortgage industry for agency
enforcement purposes. In fact, data suggests that state consumer
protection bureaus are more likely to bring an enforcement case
against a business with less than three employees than one with
more than 400; even more commonly, these bureaus file actions
299
against individuals as opposed to business entities. For example,
state consumer bureaus bring a large percentage of suits against
the home repair industry, which itself explains why suits against
300
small businesses and individuals are so common. These distinctions do not provide a meaningful difference that justifies protecting homeowners, but not renters, as consumers.
C. Private Enforcement Is Insufficient
The Tenant Revolution of the 1970s was an essential step forward for tenants but, in contrast to other consumer classes, enforcement agencies still do not prioritize tenant protection, leaving
tenants to enforce their own rights. 301 Such a system is largely ineffective. 302 Regardless of the reason private enforcement of tenants’
298. See Alana Semuels, When Wall Street Is Your Landlord, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/02/single-family-landlords-wallstreet/582394 [https://perma.cc/647G-F3NF].
299. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 61–62.
300. See Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66; ABBE WILL, JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES,
ACHIEVING SCALE IN THE RESIDENTIAL REMODELING INDUSTRY: FINDINGS FROM INTERVIEWS
WITH INDUSTRY LEADERS, at iii (2014), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default
/files/w14-2_will.pdf [https://perma.cc/762E-G96M] (“[T]he industry continues to be
highly fragmented, with the vast majority of remodeling companies operating as relatively
small, single-location businesses.”).
301. See Super, supra note 28, at 459.
302. Id. at 398 (stating warranty of habitability has not proven effective); Melissa T.
Lonegrass, Eliminating Landlord Retaliation in England and Wales – Lessons from the United
States, 75 LA. L. REV. 1071, 1108–17 (2015) (finding anti-retaliation laws have not proven
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rights does not work, it is fairly clear that it does not. Indeed,
“the results achieved by” the pro-tenant reforms of the 1970s “have
304
been far from what their advocates predicted.”
As discussed, the most important innovations of the Tenant
Revolution were the warranty of habitability and anti-retaliation
305
laws. Both have proven ineffective. As observed by one scholar:
“[B]oth statistical and anecdotal reports suggest that tenants lose
nearly all eviction cases, whether or not landlord retaliation is involved. In fact, reports that tenants ‘always’ lose eviction cases, or
306
lose in 95% to 99% of cases, are not unusual.” Similarly, a study
of 2014 eviction cases in Essex County, New Jersey found that ten307
ants asserted the habitability defense in only 0.2% of cases. Interestingly, commentators have gone to great lengths to diagnose the
shortcomings of a private enforcement-based tenants’ rights regime, but often the proposed solutions, such as providing tenants
free attorneys or reforming the summary eviction process, still
308
leave tenants almost entirely reliant on private enforcement.

effective in the United States); Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 194–203 (2000) (citing summary
eviction procedures and other factors as reasons the Tenant Revolution did not produce the
desired results); Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15, at 8 (documenting the prevalence of illegal
lease clauses).
303. Super, supra note 28, at 394.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 394; see also Lonegrass, supra note 302, at 1106.
306. Lonegrass, supra note 302, at 1107 (“Additionally, reported decisions in which tenants prevail on retaliatory eviction claims are few and far between . . . .”).
307. Paula A. Franzese, Abbott Gorin & David J. Guznik, The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
Importantly, the study finds the warranty of habitability to be effective in remedying code
violations in the few instances that it is raised. However, the article is largely dedicated to
explaining barriers to the defense being raised.
308. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 17, at 510–17 (arguing for additional compulsory lease
terms); see generally Franzese et al., supra note 307 (arguing for removing impediments to
tenants’ ability to assert defenses to eviction); Denise J. Deschenes, Consumer Protection Legislation and the Assertion of Tenant Rights: The Massachusetts Paradigm, 59 B.U. L. REV. 483, 503–
05 (1979) (advocating tenant use of UDAP laws in private lawsuits); Spector, supra note 302
(advocating for reforms to summary eviction process); Lurie, supra note 106 (advocating for
private fair housing litigation); Lonegrass, supra note 302 (advocating reforms to better enable tenants to raise retaliation); Grellmann, supra note 106, at 317 (noting that the Protective Tenants at Foreclosure Act is best enforced by tenants in state courts as opposed to by a
government agency). The main exception seems to be where commentators propose that
steps be taken to better enable HUD to regulate landlords receiving housing subsidies,
though some commentators also argue in fairly general terms that more government enforcement of tenants’ rights is necessary. See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 208 (offering a publicprivate enforcement hybrid solution); Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 42–43 (advocating,
in part, for a court database to bolster HUD enforcement, though this argument ignores
that only a very small percentage of poor tenants receive HUD benefits); see also Super, supra
note 28, at 461 (advocating, primarily, that expanded housing subsidies is key to protecting
tenants).
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Providing tenants with counsel and bolstering available defenses
309
will help tenants as a whole. For example, New York’s recent ten310
ant reforms have made a tremendous difference. But, at least until rent control and free counsel are enacted on a broad scale, pub311
lic enforcement is essential to filling private enforcement gaps.
Not surprisingly, the deck is largely stacked against tenants. The
advances of the Tenant Revolution were designed to allow tenants
to play defense. As stated by David Super, “The essence of the tenants’ rights revolution was . . . straightforward . . . . Tenants could
raise the landlord’s failure to comply with [the implied warranties
of habitability and repair] as a defense in an eviction proceeding
312
for nonpayment of rent.” Tenants facing such abuses are expected to invite court proceedings by deliberately withholding
313
rent. Doing so, however, is an extremely risky proposition, as it
merely places at-risk tenants in a summary court proceeding al314
ready weighed heavily against them. Further, once in court, tenants must often escrow rent to pursue their defenses, such that the
tenant must effectively pay rent before arguing in court that rent
315
should be abated. This requirement is often cost-prohibitive for
tenants, especially if the tenants’ rental money was spent on alter316
native shelter or needed repairs.
Further, the “summary” nature of eviction proceedings cannot
317
be overstated. One study found that the average eviction hearing

309. Mara Gay, Opinion, Evictions Are Down in New York. Thank the Voters., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/26/opinion/new-york-evictions.html
[https://perma.cc/PX3E-FCLD] (detailing the efficacy of rent control laws and providing
tenants facing eviction with counsel).
310. See Gay, supra note 309; see also Josh Barbanel, New York Evictions Are Plunging Under
New Rent Control Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-yorkevictions-are-plunging-under-new-rent-control-law-11574793114 [https://perma.cc/TYK7QHHZ].
311. See Waterstone, supra note 29.
312. Super, supra note 28, at 394.
313. Id. at 407–08.
314. Id.
315. Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 13–14.
316. See id.
317. As stated by one scholar:
A summary proceeding for eviction exists in every state . . . . [T]his procedure fails
to accommodate what scholars have called a “revolution” in the law of landlords
and residential tenants that significantly expanded tenants’ rights by the adoption
of such doctrines as the warranties of habitability and retaliatory evictions. Instead . . . continued use of the summary proceeding . . . undermines many of the
benefits the revolution hoped to accomplish.
Spector, supra note 302, at 137.
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318

lasts for one minute and 44 seconds. Such procedures include
319
little formal discovery.
Even more importantly, the most vulnerable tenants can rarely
320
afford counsel and thus must navigate a chaotic court process on
321
their own. Landlords, on the other hand, almost inevitably have
322
attorneys who tend to run the show in eviction court. Providing
free counsel to tenants facing eviction is an essential step and
323
makes a tremendous difference for tenants. Still, these counsels
are forced to represent tenants within the confines of existing eviction procedures. 324
Similarly, to obtain free counsel, tenants must come to court.
325
Defaults amongst tenants are high. Eviction notices are often
confusing and come with very quickly approaching court dates,
326
sometimes in as little as three days. Such hearings are inevitably
scheduled during the workday or in the morning when parents are
shuffling their kids off to school.

318. LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S
EVICTION COURT 7 (2003), https://lcbh.org/sites/default/files/resources/2003-lcbhchicago-eviction-court-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKM2-5AS3]; Curtis Black, Chicago
Should Implement Right to Counsel in Eviction Court Like New York and San Francisco, CHI. REP.
(Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-should-implement-right-tocounsel-in-eviction-court-like-new-york-and-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/TZ4H-K73P].
319. Working: How Does a Tenants’ Rights Attorney Do His Job?, SLATE (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://slate.com/podcasts/working/2019/11/how-does-a-tenants-rights-attorney-do-his-job
[https://perma.cc/GX2Z-CUSG]. Some states court rules explicitly disallow discovery in
eviction cases. See, e.g., N.J. COURT RULE 6:4-3. Ironically, tenant defenses against landlords
often require extensive discovery and even expert testimony. Tenants raising a habitability
defense, for example, must present extensive evidence of the condition of the home and
their attempts to notify the landlord of the condition. To prove the presence of lead paint
and its health effects, tenants will likely need expert testimony or at least that of a home inspector or doctor. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Lepage, Lead-Based Paint Litigation and the Problem of
Causation: Toward a Unified Theory of Market Share Liability, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 155, 158 (1995).
320. Franzese et al., supra note 307, at 12–13.
321. Super, supra note 28, at 406–07.
322. See Gay, supra note 309 (detailing how pro se plaintiffs must go up against represented landlords in New York); Heidi Schultheis & Caitlin Rooney, A Right to Counsel Is a
Right to a Fighting Chance, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2019/10/02/475263/right-counsel-right-fightingchance [https://perma.cc/7UHR-P5C4] (“When it comes to evictions, tenants are set up to
fail. In eviction lawsuits nationwide, an estimated 90 percent of landlords have legal representation, while only 10 percent of tenants do.”).
323. Schultheis & Rooney, supra note 322.
324. Munira Alimire, Examining the Tenant Right to Counsel Rollout Landscape, MEDIUM
(July 15, 2019), https://medium.com/legal-design-and-innovation/examining-the-tenantright-to-counsel-rollout-landscape-567f70f70899 [https://perma.cc/JN58-KLPS].
325. See Badger & Bui, supra note 7 (“‘The whole system works on default judgments and
people not showing up,’ said Martin Wegbreit, director of litigation at the Central Virginia
Legal Aid Society. ‘Imagine if every person asked for a trial. The system would bog down in a
couple of months.’ ”).
326. Move Out in Three Days? Are They Serious? The Meaning of Eviction Notices, IOWA LEGAL
AID (June 11, 2018), https://www.iowalegalaid.org/resource/move-out-in-three-days-arethey-serious-the-m [https://perma.cc/PXD9-TAPA].
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These high rates of default are, indeed, no coincidence. The
eviction process is designed to be carried out in the absence of
tenant-defendants, as evictions generally take place during overcrowded court “cattle calls,” which likely could not function if all
327
the tenants show up. Further, landlords often mislead tenants
328
about their right to appear, or the usefulness of appearing.
Fear of retaliation also significantly hamstrings tenants’ ability to
enforce their own rights in court, even in a defensive posture, thus
329
The most rational course
contributing to high rates of default.
of action may be for tenants to simply leave and find new housing,
330
even if there are viable defenses or counterclaims to the eviction.
Providing tenants with an additional disincentive to litigate, if tenants leave before an eviction judgment is entered, they avoid a
331
damning mark on their credit report. Even if no judgment is entered, prospective landlords may catch wind that tenant-applicants
are in litigation with their current landlord, dimming tenants’
332
chances of finding new quality housing.
Undermining the entire current protection scheme, private enforcement of state anti-retaliation laws has also proven largely ineffective, again due to the fact that most tenants are not represented
in a court process already stacked against them. Further, retaliatory
motive is empirically difficult to prove. And, ironically, the threat
of retaliation may deter some tenants from alleging retaliation. As
with other consumers, statutory protections should be coupled

327. See Badger & Bui, supra note 7.
328. See generally, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 15 (noting the prominence of illegal
lease clauses and their misleading effects on tenants).
329. See Spector, supra note 302, at 137; Lonegrass, supra note 302.
330. Super, supra note 28, at 408.
331. See D.C. BAR PRO BONO CTR., Judgments, Writs, and Stopping Evictions - Information
for Tenants, LAWHELP.ORG, https://www.lawhelp.org/dc/resource/judgments-writs-andstopping-evictions-inform [https://perma.cc/3EKH-XYMZ].
332. See Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to Protect
Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344, 1353 (2007). It is also very difficult for tenants to get negative rental history marks removed from the credit reports used by future landlords. Most
creditors, like mortgage lenders, credit card companies and car financers, rely on the “big
three” credit reporting agencies—Trans Union, Equifax, and Experian. Therefore, consumers are entitled to a free annual copy of the credit reports creditors rely on and can complain to credit reporting entities under the Fair Credit Reporting Act accordingly. The tenant screening industry, which is a subset of the consumer reporting industry, is less
oligopolistic, which, ironically, hurts consumers because it is much harder to determine
what entity to complain to in the instance of a potential inaccuracy. See Kleysteuber, supra, at
1356; Paul Schack, Tenant Screening Agencies and Reports, MASS. L. HELP (May 2017),
https://www.masslegalhelp.org/housing/lt1-chapter-2-agencies-reports [https://perma.cc
/49K7-CK2Q]; see also TEX PASLEY, HENRY OSTRO-SHAH & ERIC SIROTA, SHRIVER CTR. ON
POVERTY LAW, SCREENED OUT: HOW TENANT SCREENING REPORTS UNDERMINE FAIR HOUSING
LAWS AND DEPRIVE TENANTS OF EQUAL ACCESS TO HOUSING IN ILLINOIS 3–8 (2021),
https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/tenant-screening-finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3ZT-EAXV].
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with the attention of consumer protection agencies, as private enforcement of these laws does not alone prove effective.
Public consumer enforcement, while far from panacean, avoids
many of these pitfalls, often for obvious reason. Enforcement
agencies have far deeper pockets and far more power than individual tenants. Enforcement agencies control the pace of litigation
as plaintiffs outside of the confines of the summary eviction process. They do not fear retaliation.
Otherwise put, consumer agencies must police the rental market
for the same reasons they do other markets—consumers are neither powerful nor coordinated enough to effectively police for
333
themselves. Tenants, who are often low income and who must litigate their claims in a summary court process with potential homelessness hanging over their head, are uniquely disadvantaged by
these asymmetries. There is reason to believe that consumer fraud
334
bureaus can effectively protect renters from abuses, just as they
protect consumers in analogous industries.
D. Public Enforcement Serves a Distinct Purpose from Private Enforcement
But, more than that, consumer agency enforcement efforts play
a distinct and complementary role to private enforcement. 335 Ten333. See Waterstone, supra note 29, at 461–63 (arguing that public enforcement can
overcome financial disincentives to private litigation and that “most of the limitations that
apply to private attorneys general do not apply to public enforcement authorities”). The
article notes that public enforcement has become necessary as a substitute for private class
action litigation as courts curtail the availability of class action litigation.
334. See, e.g., Final Consent Judgment, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., LLC, No. 13CH20715
(June 3, 2015); see also Carrie Wells, Maryland Attorney General Settles with Safeguard Properties,
BALT. SUN (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-safeguardsettlement-20150828-story.html; Waterstone, supra note 29, at 456 (noting examples of the
efficacy of both public and private structural litigation); ETHAN LUTZ, MIKE LITT & ED
MIERZWINSKI, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, POSITIONED TO PROTECT: HOW STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITIES CAN FILL THE CFPB VOID 28–29 (2018); Cox et al., supra note 29, at 49; Mark
Totten, The Enforcers & The Great Recession, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1638, 1644 (2015);
Peterson, supra note 29, at 1104; Abigail M. Lyle & Nikki Skolnekovich, Client Alert: State Attorneys General Continue to Fill the Enforcement Gap for Consumer, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH
(Jan. 2019), https://www.huntonak.com/images/content/5/5/v2/55737/state-ags-fillenforcement-gap-consumer-protections.pdf [https://perma.cc/9265-6AXU] (demonstrating attorneys advising financial clients to comply with regulations and promptly address consumer complaints to avoid UDAP enforcement actions); A Midyear Review of State Attorney
General Enforcement, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP: INSIGHTS (June 29, 2018),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2018/06/a-midyear-review-of-stateattorney-general-enforce [https://perma.cc/7TCH-M2JH] (warning clients of costs associated with AG enforcement actions and illustrating how AG consumer divisions have empirically helped shaped large scale policy).
335. LUTZ ET AL., supra note 334, at 28–29; Cox et al., supra note 29, at 49; see also Totten
supra note 334; Peterson, supra note 29, at 1104; Lyle & Skolnekovich, supra note 334; FOLEY
& LARDNER LLP, supra note 334. See generally Pridgen, supra note 33 (emphasizing the complimentary roles played by public and private enforcement).
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ant litigants, and their attorneys, are focused on achieving the tenant’s immediate needs, be it allowing the tenant to stay in the
home for the long or short term or designing a move-out plan that
least damages the tenant’s credit. Of course, in the aggregate,
336
these private efforts can lead to systemic change. But public enforcement actions can focus more deliberately on the systemic
337
regulation of an industry. Public enforcement agencies, likewise,
338
can act as aggregators of tenant grievances. Further, public enforcement efforts are, by design, more specifically targeted and
higher profile than private litigation. This enhances the general
deterrent value of consumer enforcement actions, especially where
such actions are brought under UDAP laws that generally allow for
far more powerful remedies than the largely reactive protections of
339
tenant-landlord law.
As with other industries, private and public enforcement of tenants’ rights complement each other. The Foreclosure Crisis
sparked the emergence of mandatory foreclosure mediation programs and increased funding to provide individual representation
340
to homeowners, but also the establishment of the CFPB and activism from state attorneys general. There is already a great deal of
literature arguing that enforcement is most effective when robust
efforts are made both by private litigants and enforcement agen341
cies. Relatedly, high profile enforcement actions may help bring
342
more attention to tenants and bolster their private enforcement.
Tenants need such protection at least as much as other consumers.
The need for increased public enforcement becomes that much
343
greater as the rental industry becomes increasingly nationalized.
Indeed, corporations are increasingly dominating the rental market. An entity with significant consolidated resources, such as a
government agency, is thus necessary to serve as a check upon this
industry. As stated by Harvard’s 2018 report on The State of the
Nation’s Housing, “[a]lthough conversions of single family homes
336. See, e.g., Barbanel, supra note 310.
337. Waterstone, supra note 29, at 461 (“Apart from being allowed to play a structural
role, public enforcement authorities are uniquely suited to fill the structural enforcement
gap.”).
338. Id. at 467 (noting that enforcement by public enforcement agencies is especially
needed where individuals’ claims are likely too individuated for class action cases).
339. NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.1.
340. See, e.g., Melanca Clark & Daniel Olmos, Emerging Strategies in Foreclosure Mediation,
NCSC (2011), https://cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/financial/id/170
[https://perma.cc/PX9P-MGRN].
341. See, e.g., Pridgen, supra note 33, at 946.
342. Cf. id. (noting that state attorney general consumer enforcement actions “can
stretch the boundaries of consumer protection in ways that benefit consumers”).
343. JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26–27; Semuels, supra note 298 (noting that institutional investors are buying up large portions of rental stock).
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added significantly to the rental stock right after the housing crash,
multifamily construction ramped up quickly to become the main
344
source of additional supply.” In some urban areas, the domi345
nance of these larger rental companies is especially pronounced.
In fact, more recently, there has even been somewhat of a flourish346
ing of rental-backed security investors and the like. Little data exists on whether tenants in these newer multifamily buildings are
likely to face abuse. On the one hand, the new units tend to be
347
fairly high end, indicating that abuse may be less likely as wealthy
tenants are less likely to face abuse. On the other hand, large
buildings are more likely to be owned by corporate investors, and
there is some data suggesting that corporate landlords are more
348
abusive than individual landlords, at least in some respects. Regardless, relying so heavily on David to police Goliath is not sustainable. Tenant-consumers need a champion of their own, as the
government already provides for most other consumers subject to
potential abuses from businesses big and small.
E. The Importance of Public Consumer Enforcement Actions in
Furthering Other Government Interests
There is no dearth of literature on the negative externalities of
housing instability. Housing stability is a keystone of public
349
health. Similarly, “[T]he impact of poor housing conditions on
350
educational achievement is well established.” Housing instability
351
is also a significant criminogenic factor. Assisting tenants facing

344. JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26.
345. Id. at 26–27.
346. See Semuels, supra note 298.
347. See JCHS 2018, supra note 13, at 26–27.
348. See Semuels, supra note 298 (quoting tenant stating “ ‘I said I’d never rent from a
big company again’ ”); Hyojung Lee, Who Owns Rental Properties, and Is It Changing?, HARV.
JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD.: BLOG (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/blog/
who-owns-rental-properties-and-is-it-changing [https://perma.cc/8YLG-RU92] (citing a
study that found corporate landlords are more likely to pursue eviction than smaller landlords); Mandu Sen & Moses Gates, The High Cost of Bad Landlords: Impacts of Irresponsible
Building Ownership in New York City, REG’L PLAN ASS’N (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://citylimits.org/2018/10/24/report-bad-landlords-are-few-in-number-but-destructivein-impact [https://perma.cc/5QSM-VQV3] (“But while bad landlords own only one in 50
buildings, their buildings tend to be large.”).
349. DANNY FRIEDMAN, ECOTEC, SOCIAL IMPACT OF POOR HOUSING 12 (2010),
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9406&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WCV-TN74].
350. Id. at 9.
351. See Corina Graif, Andrew S. Gladfelter & Stephen A. Matthews, Urban Poverty and
Neighborhood Effects on Crime: Incorporating Spatial and Network Perspectives, 8 SOC. COMPASS
1140, 1144 (2014); Marie Skubak Tillyer & Rebecca J. Walter, Low-Income Housing and Crime:
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landlord abuses is thus essential to government goals of ensuring
public health, providing students a quality education, and fighting
crime.
What bears specific mention is that government enforcement
agencies have already acknowledged this but are not fully committed to it in practice. Notably, for example, various enforcement
agencies directly regulate the use of lead paint in rental housing
352
for exactly these reasons. The presence of lead paint in rental
housing has decreased over time. But other hardships faced by
tenants have similar, if less biologically determinative, impacts. The
353
Rental Crisis is its own public health crisis.
Perhaps framing the Rental Crisis in terms of its negative externalities will help highlight the need for public enforcement. Managing public health epidemics, providing education, reducing
crime, and addressing neighborhood blight are familiar roles of
government. Even if protecting individual tenants does not fit
neatly into the role of enforcement agencies, protecting society as
a whole clearly does.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Having argued that consumer enforcement agencies should better incorporate tenant protection into their mandates and explored the current barriers to them doing so, this Part will propose
specific reforms to help agencies overcome such barriers and more
robustly use their enforcement powers to protect tenantconsumers. These barriers, of course, vary by agency. And agencies
in states whose UDAP statute does not apply to tenants obviously
face additional barriers to using their enforcement authority to
help tenants. As such, this section will propose separate reforms
depending on whether courts read the underlying UDAP statute to
protect tenants. Many of the reforms suggested for one camp,
however, may help the other.

The Influence of Housing Development and Neighborhood Characteristics, 65 CRIME & DELINQ., 969,
969–93 (2018).
352. Press Release, Envt’l Prot. Agency, EPA Enforcement Actions Help Protect Vulnerable Communities from Lead-Based Paint Health Hazards (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-enforcement-actions-help-protect-vulnerablecommunities-lead-based-paint-health-1 [https://perma.cc/LGR3-JFLD]; Press Release,
Hous. & Urb. Dev., Secretary Carson Kicks-Off National Healthy Homes Month – Announces Protect Our Kids! Campaign to Enforce Lead Safety Rules (June 1, 2018),
https://archives.hud.gov/news/2018/pr18-051.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZUV2-WCQ2].
353. Allison Bovell-Ammo & Megan Sandel, The Hidden Health Crisis of Eviction, B.U. SCH.
PUB. HEALTH (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.bu.edu/sph/2018/10/05/the-hidden-healthcrisis-of-eviction [https://perma.cc/7N4Q-Q2TB].
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Before entering discussion, however, it is important to give credit where it is due. The following Section will thus discuss the nonlaw enforcement actions agencies take to protect tenants.
A. Ways Consumer Enforcement Agencies Currently Help Tenants Beyond
Law Enforcement
First, many agencies engage in educational and outreach efforts.
354
355
Some publish or edit know-your-rights materials for renters and
materials for landlords to help assure legal compliance. Agencies,
356
similarly, hold in-person workshops for tenants and landlords.
Importantly, there is not necessarily a correlation between the
agencies that undergo these efforts and those whose UDAP statutes
357
apply to tenants or who more commonly litigate these issues. Indeed, bureaus hesitant to litigate on behalf of tenants may vigorously take up other tenant protection efforts. Hawai’I, for example,
whose UDAP statute does not cover tenants, operates a tenant hot358
line through its consumer protection agency.
Further, consumer enforcement agencies may engage in lobby359
ing on behalf of tenants. For instance, while Iowa’s consumer
fraud bureau may lack authority to litigate tenant matters related
to violations of Iowa’s Landlord Tenant Act, the office has lobbied
360
the state legislature to enhance tenant protections. When students in Iowa City began arguing for security deposit reform, for
354. See, e.g., Renter’s Rights, ATT’Y GEN. TEX., https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/
consumer-protection/home-real-estate-and-travel/renters-rights [https://perma.cc/3UC7V56Z]; Landlord/Tenant Guide, WIS. DEP’T OF AG., TRADE & CONSUMER PROT.,
https://datcp.wi.gov/Pages/Publications/LandlordTenantGuide.aspx
[https://perma.cc
/4GDF-RRTU].
355. See, e.g., Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
356. See, e.g., Vermont Interview, supra note 232.
357. For example, the Texas Attorney General’s Consumer Fraud Bureau creates resources to educate tenants but has brought few consumer protection enforcement actions
on behalf of tenants. See Renter’s Rights, supra note 354. Contra infra Appendix A.
358. HAW. DEP’T OF COM. & CONSUMER AFFS., HANDBOOK FOR THE HAWAII RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD-TENANT CODE (2016),
https://cca.hawaii.gov/hfic/files/2013/03/landlordtenant-handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/M56F-BGDJ]. Towards the proposition that Hawai’i’s UDAP does not cover landlord-tenant matters, see, for example, Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, 80 Haw. 54, 59 (1995); Kim v. CB Richard Ellis Haw., Inc., 288 Fed. App’x 312, 314
(9th Cir. 2008); and Souza v. Fisher, No. 1RC12-1-000925, 2017 WL 1293657, at *7 (Haw. Ct.
App. Apr. 7, 2017).
359. See, e.g., Press Release Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen., AG Paxton Joins 25-State Bipartisan Coalition Calling on Education Secretary to Preserve States’ Oversight of Student Loan
Industry (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxtonjoins-25-state-bipartisan-coalition-calling-education-secretary-preserve-states-oversight
[https://perma.cc/E5GN-KVN8] (providing an example of attorneys general lobbying on
behalf of consumers); see also Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 172 (2013).
360. Iowa Interview, supra note 242.
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example, the consumer fraud bureau sent a representative to the
361
state capital to engage in a prolonged lobbying effort. As stated
by the office, “our lobbyists are over there [at the state legislature]
just to . . . represent the consumer and make sure consumers have
362
a voice.” Notably, Iowa’s office also lobbied to compensate for its
own lack of enforcement power in the rental arena, successfully
persuading the legislature to ensure tenants maintained robust
363
private remedies against landlords.
Consumer fraud bureaus also help tenants by engaging in the
initial mediation of their complaints and by referring tenants to
other sources of help. Many consumer protection bureaus have
processes whereby initial consumer complaints are fielded by nonattorney advocates. These advocates may attempt to mediate complaints as a matter of course, such that, when a tenant files a complaint, the advocate sends a mediation letter to the landlord being
364
complained about. This process alone can help the individual
tenant without the office escalating the matter further. Consumer
fraud bureaus may additionally refer complaining tenants to pro
365
bono legal assistance or code enforcement. The value of these
efforts should not be downplayed. Still, reforms are necessary for
consumer agencies to more robustly utilize their enforcement
power to protect tenants.
B. Reforms in States Whose UDAP Laws Do Not Protect Tenants
In a sizeable minority of states, 366 it is difficult for consumer
fraud bureaus to protect tenants because the UDAP statute they
enforce does not protect tenants. The most obvious reform, then,
is for the legislature to amend the statute to cover tenant-landlord
matters. Such reforms can take a number of forms. Most intuitively, the legislature can amend the definition of “commerce” to explicitly include tenant-landlord matters. Further, the legislature
can incorporate the state tenant-landlord law to the list of enumerated statutes whose violation is considered a per se UDAP violation
or, more broadly, add language that the breach of any consumer-

361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See, e.g., Michigan Interview, supra note 247 (“We mediate them [complaints from
tenants] . . . like any other complaint that we get.”).
365. See, e.g., South Carolina Interview, supra note 241; Iowa Interview, supra note 242;
Idaho Interview, supra note 236; Connecticut Interview, supra note 244; Vermont Interview,
supra note 232.
366. See NCLC, supra note 27, § 8.2; see generally Thomas, supra note 145, at §§ 3, 6.
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oriented statute also constitutes a presumptive UDAP violation.
More subtly still, the legislature can add a provision to the tenantlandlord code giving the attorney general enforcement authority
over some or all of its provisions. There are, however, significant
hurdles to enacting legislative fixes, especially in states with powerful landlord and property management lobbies. It is thus worth
exploring other courses of action that will allow these agencies to
more robustly protect tenants.
One regulatory solution, which bypasses the legislative process,
is for consumer agencies to enact regulations interpreting their
UDAP statute to apply to tenants. The agency cannot enact regulations which contradict the plain language of the statute. In many
instances, however, courts holding that UDAP does not apply to
367
tenants are interpreting an ambiguous statute. For example, as
discussed above, several courts read tenant-landlord law to displace
UDAP’s application to tenants even where the statute itself con368
tains no anti-bootstrapping provision. In such instances, courts
369
may defer to regulations espousing a contrary interpretation.
Another solution, which requires the passage of neither statespecific litigation nor the adoption of regulation, is participation in
multistate litigation. State consumer agencies have shown a willingness to team up with other states to regulate industries not covered by their own UDAP statutes. Indeed, states participated in national mortgage servicing litigation even where their state UDAP
370
statute did not apply to mortgage banks. Because defendants in
multistate litigation must often settle with all plaintiffs at once,
states may be able to obtain consent judgments even where their
371
underlying UDAP statute does not cover the regulated industry.
This solution is increasingly appealing as the rental industry has
372
become increasingly nationalized in recent years.
Similarly, state consumer fraud bureaus may collaborate with
federal actors beyond joint litigation efforts. For example, state
consumer fraud bureaus may be able to bring larger scale abuses to
367. See supra Section II.A.2; e.g., Heritage Hills v. Deacon, 551 N.E.2d 125, 127 (Ohio
1990) (holding UDAP is displaced by tenant-landlord laws even though statute contained no
regulated industry exemption).
368. See supra Section II.A.2.
369. Aaron Saiger, Chevron and State Deference in Administrative Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
555, 557–60 (2014) (noting that, while most states do not embrace Chevron deference as enthusiastically as federal courts, most state courts do defer at least somewhat to state regulations in certain instances).
370. For example, Michigan entered into a consent judgment with the defendants in the
national mortgage settlement regarding their mortgage servicing practices even though
Michigan’s UDAP is read not to apply to the mortgage-servicing industry. NCLC, supra note
27, at App. B.
371. Id.
372. See Lee, supra note 348; see Semuels, supra note 298.
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the attention of the FTC and DOJ and aid in investigations. As
discussed earlier, while the FTC and CFPB do not prioritize tenant
issues, state consumer enforcement action can influence federal
374
priorities. As such, even in states where UDAP statutes do not
cover tenants, consumer fraud agencies may take enforcement action to protect renters.
C. Reforms in States Whose UDAP Law Covers Tenants
As discussed, consumer protection agencies tend not to fully incorporate tenant protection into their mandates even if the underlying UDAP statute and corresponding jurisprudence allow them
to do so. This Section proposes reforms that will better allow such
agencies to protect tenant-consumers. This Section will largely focus on the institutional barriers, especially those cited by bureaus
themselves, and propose ways to overcome them. Section IV.C.1
will propose changes in institutional norms and viewpoints (intangible reforms). Section IV.C.2 will discuss reforms to bureaus’
complaint processes, and Section IV.C.3 will address concerns
about agency resources.
1. Intangible Reforms
At a somewhat fundamental level, if agencies are to better protect tenants, they must start viewing tenants as similarly situated
with other consumers. For example, the notion that agencies have
insufficient resources to protect tenants begs the question, why
agency resources should be allocated to other consumer groups instead. While it is quite possible that agencies focusing more on
tenants must focus less on, for instance, home repair cases, this only becomes a reason not to prioritize tenants if home repair consumers are already considered more central to the agency’s mission.
Similarly, before assuming tenants have access to other resources, it is necessary to assess the practical value of those alternative resources. Agencies must ensure not to create a Hobson’s

373. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Sweep Against 10 Auto
Dealers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftcannounces-sweep-against-10-auto-dealers [https://perma.cc/4X2X-QD25]. Tellingly, Michigan’s UDAP law likely does not cover truth-in-lending matters regarding auto loans. Still, in
2014, Michigan’s Attorney General helped the FTC investigate lending fraud by an auto
lender as part of the FTC’s industry sweep.
374. Pridgen, supra note 33, at 930.
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choice for tenants, where consumer agencies do not focus on tenant issues because tenants have access to false or inadequate alternatives. For example, while code enforcement and Legal Aid strive
to protect tenants, code enforcement is severely hamstrung by un375
derfunding and limitations in scope, and Legal Aid only has the
376
capacity to help so many clients.
Relatedly, agencies must ensure parity between tenants and other consumer groups who have other resources available to them.
377
For example, agencies commonly litigate home repair cases even
though repair contractors are often regulated by state licensing
boards, local permit administrators, and distinct statutory
378
schemes.
Similarly, bureaus may be hesitant to litigate tenant cases because tenant complaints are individuated and fact intensive. But
this does not distinguish tenant cases from home repair or used car
379
cases, which bureaus often do litigate. Indeed, home repair cases
necessarily involve analyzing the quality of multiple home repair
jobs and used car cases involve investigating the specific problems
with specific cars. In fact, it is all the more important for enforcement agencies to aggregate individuated complaints as their fact
380
intensive nature may make them ineligible for class relief.
Consumer protection agencies also appear more willing to target classically “deceptive” business practices than practices that fall
381
more into “unfairness,” to the potential detriment of tenants. As
noted above, abuses faced by tenants are more likely to be coer-

375. See Sabbeth, supra note 208, at 130.
376. The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/what-legalaid/unmet-need-legal-aid [https://perma.cc/56PJ-QXZ8].
377. Cox et al., supra note 29, at 66 tbl. 4.
378. HOME ADVISOR, supra note 199.
379. See, e.g., Your Rights under Maryland’s Lemon Law, MD. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.
marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Pages/CPD/lemon.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LML2-GCB5]
(providing examples of Lemon Law violations which exemplify the likely fact-intensive nature of such enforcement actions).
380. See Waterstone, supra note 29, at 463.
381. See MORRISON & FOSTER, THE CFPB & UDAAP: A “KNOW IT WHEN YOU SEE IT?”
https://media2.mofo.com/documents/140604-cfpb-udaap.pdf
STANDARD 7–28 (2014),
[https://perma.cc/Z9DF-2MPC] (showing that the CFPB employs deception authority nearly three times as often as unfairness authority); James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 3 J. ANTITRUST ENF’T 87, 109–
10 (2015) (discussing FTC hesitance to expand the scope of its standalone “unfairness” authority); Peterson, supra note 29, at 1092 (noting that CFPB unfairness claims are generally
coupled with deception claims because most ‘deceptive’ behavior also likely constitutes ‘unfair’ behavior and also the CFPB’s cautious use of “abusiveness” standard); Cox et al., supra
note 29, at 53 (noting that between 2011 and 2015, the CFPB only employed the “abusiveness” standard, which is in ways analogous to state unfairness); Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC
and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 350–60 (2008); see supra Section II.C.1 (illustrating how representatives from several enforcement bureaus note that their bureau is more
likely to target more classic instances of “deception”).
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cive, injurious, or violating of public policy than classically deceptive. For example, an illegal lockout, while arguably implicitly
communicating a deceptive message to tenants, is more clearly
382
problematic because it fits within the UDAP unfairness factors.
While “unfair” may be a more inherently ambiguous standard than
“deceptive,” a shift towards greater enforcement of unfair practices
will be beneficial to tenant consumers.
2. Lack of Actionable Tenant Complaints
A more concrete barrier to consumer agencies prioritizing tenant issues is the lack of actionable complaints for tenants. Agencies, understandably, rely largely on consumer complaints to find
targets of enforcement actions. Even though agencies do receive a
quantitatively high number of tenant complaints, they tend to lack
a critical mass of complaints against a single target regarding a distinct issue. There are ways for agencies to police industries, however, while relying less on seemingly anecdotal individual complaints
trickling in one at a time.
Agencies can learn about industry abuses from an array of
sources beyond consumer complaints. Such sources may have already aggregated consumer complaints in ways useful to consumer
protection agencies. One such source is media reports, which may
help identify bad landlords, their bad practices, and the names of
tenants complaining about them. Searches of legal databases to
find the businesses most commonly facing litigation from tenants
may also prove useful. Collaborations with code enforcement, Legal Aid, and other entities who track tenant grievances may further
inform consumer agencies of potential targets.
Agencies should also use their pre-litigation subpoena power to
police the rental industry. Consumer protection agencies generally
have the power to issue pre-litigation investigatory subpoenas
against potential targets. In all probability, tenants are often more
likely to complain directly to landlords than to consumer enforcement agencies, and agencies may be able to subpoena such inter383
nal complaints. Bureaus can employ creative strategies to find
targets. In instances where an agency learns, perhaps from the me382. See Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 5, 2014) (denying Safeguard’s motion to dismiss Illinois’s UDAP claim based on Safeguard illegally ejecting legal occupants of foreclosed homes and stating that the deceptiveness element that the
business must intend for the consumer to rely on the illegal activity makes little sense in
evaluating unfairness).
383. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 78, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013); see also, NCLC, supra note 27, § 13.
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dia, that abuses within a certain industry are rampant, the agency
can subpoena the subjects of these media reports or, if lacking
such reports, the largest players in an industry notorious for abuse.
For example, one of the higher profile state consumer agency
actions protecting tenants was Illinois’s 2013 lawsuit against Safeguard Properties for illegally evicting tenants and homeowners
384
from foreclosed properties. The lawsuit resulted in a milliondollar settlement, which largely went towards restitution for consumers, and the first major reforms in the default property man385
agement industry. Tellingly, Illinois’s Complaint alleged both
that Safeguard was the largest player in the industry and that the
Attorney General had knowledge of many consumer complaints
386
made directly to Safeguard by Illinois residents.
Consumer fraud bureaus may also take action to solicit more
targeted and actionable consumer complaints. Media and publicity
campaigns and initial high-profile actions by the consumer fraud
bureaus themselves can effectively solicit consumers to complain
about specific issues or against specific entities. New York has employed both targeted solicitation of tenant complaints and collaboration with other tenant service providers to more aggressively en387
force tenants’ rights as consumer rights. For example, New
York’s AG, by far the nation’s most active in enforcing tenants’
388
rights, employs a special tenant complaint form and collaborates
with other agencies and non-profits specifically formed to assist
389
tenants. The state’s expressed intent to help tenants as consumers then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy by generating additional tenant complaints.

384. See generally Complaint, Illinois v. Safeguard Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
Sept. 9, 2013).
385. Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madigan Announces $1 Million Settlement with Safeguard Properties (June 3, 2015), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2015
_06/20150603.html [https://perma.cc/H6EZ-XYCH].
386. See Ill. Att’y Gen., supra note 385; Complaint at ¶¶ 11, 78, Illinois v. Safeguard
Props., No. 2013CH20715 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2013).
387. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James And Governor
Cuomo Announce Lawsuit Against Queens Landlord for Violating Rent Stabilization Laws
and Tenant Harassment (Mar. 1, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorneygeneral-james-and-governor-cuomo-announce-lawsuit-against-queens
[https://perma.cc
/VH4U-UHS3] (discussing AG consumer fraud lawsuit, in collaboration with NY’s Tenant
Protection Unit, Legal Services NYC, and other organizations protecting tenants, against
major landlord for tenant harassment and violation of rent control laws); see also Tenant
Harassment,
BLDGS.,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/buildings/renter/tenantNYC.GOV:
harrassment.page [https://perma.cc/KK87-8PG6] (describing coordination between state
and local agencies by Tenant Harassment Task Force).
388. See N.Y. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF L., RENT SECURITY COMPLAINT FORM (2019),
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/nyc-rent-security-complaint-english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N388-KFE6].
389. See N.Y. Att’y Gen., supra note 387.
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3. Concerns about Resources
Consumer enforcement bureaus may be concerned that if they
venture strongly into the tenant arena, they will be overwhelmed
with tenant complaints. After all, consumer bureaus do not have
the resources to handle thousands of individual tenant complaints,
nor are they equipped to double as code enforcement. This obstacle, however, is not unique to regulation of the rental industry.
Consumer protection agencies adapt to this problem in their policing of other markets and can apply similar strategies here.
First, especially in more concentrated rental markets, agencies
can target larger rental property investors or property management companies. Such actions are likely to be high profile and
thus have at least some general deterrent effect across the industry.
In pursuing mortgage servicing litigation, for example, consumer
390
enforcement agencies tellingly targeted the biggest banks.
Further, forcing a market-dominant business to reform may
force industry-wide reform. For example, if a major property management company agrees not to solicit renters with leases containing illegal provisions, landlords utilizing that company must ensure
their leases do not contain those illegal provisions, or else must
find another management company, which may be difficult and
expensive.
In less concentrated markets, consumer fraud bureaus still find
ways to send shots across the bow. For example, agencies may engage in industry sweeps, where a number of lawsuits are filed simultaneously against different businesses within an industry to chal391
lenge a common industry practice. If, for example, a consumer
fraud bureau announces a number of lawsuits against small landlords for failing to make repairs, this sends a message to other

390. See generally Settlement Documents, supra note 122 (listing settlement documents from
national mortgage litigation brought by states and federal agencies targeting major mortgage servicers such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase).
391. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Justice Department and Federal Partners Announce Enforcement Actions of Dietary Supplement Cases (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-partners-announceenforcement-actions-dietary-supplement-cases [https://perma.cc/RT3C-CA6W] (dietary
supplements); Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Southern Illinois Takes Part in Largest-Ever Nationwide Elder Fraud Sweep (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdil/pr/southernillinois-takes-part-largest-ever-nationwide-elder-fraud-sweep [https://perma.cc/5TZE-4NFW]
(elder fraud); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Law Enforcement Partners Announce
New Crackdown on Illegal Robocalls (June 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
press-releases/2019/06/ftc-law-enforcement-partners-announce-new-crackdown-illegal
[https://perma.cc/BQF5-UVUY] (telemarketing calls); Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen., Madigan Cracks Down on Unlicensed Public Insurance Adjusters, Home Repair Scams Across
Chicagoland Area (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012
_04/20120423.html [https://perma.cc/QLU7-DD69] (unlicensed insurance adjusting).
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small landlords. Consumer protection agencies adapt to their lack
of resources by targeting large players or taking concentrated action against a number of smaller players. Agencies can readily apply such strategies to the rental market.
CONCLUSION
Thus, while residential tenants are similarly situated to other
consumers, they lack legal parity with traditional consumers. Consumer protection agencies’ treatment of tenant issues helps illustrate this disparity. This Article attempts to elaborate upon and
propose solutions to such enforcement trends. Still, there has been
little quantitative analysis regarding the types of enforcement actions brought by consumer enforcement issues. One of the few
studies that undertakes this analysis did not code for tenant392
landlord actions. Thus, more complete quantitative corroboration of this Article’s claims will be necessary, as will a quantitative
analysis of the types of actions consumer enforcement agencies do
take to protect or educate tenants.
There is little literature of whether tenants should be treated as
consumers within a consumer protection regime dominated by
UDAP enforcement. This Article, hopefully, fills some of those
gaps and helps to bring attention to the consumer abuses faced by
tenants.
But more analysis is necessary, especially in light of COVID-19.
Consumer scams generally, and rental scams specifically, have pro393
liferated during the pandemic. Further, like the Foreclosure Crisis of the late aughts, the economic fallout from the pandemic
leaves tenants especially vulnerable. Facing job and income loss,
those seeking to rent have fewer options. A new wave of foreclo394
sures caused by the pandemic will likely lead to a new wave of
landlord absenteeism and illegal evictions by foreclosing lenders.
This Article was written primarily before the pandemic, but how
consumer agencies protect tenants in the midst of the pandemic
requires further inquiry.

392. E-mail from Cox, supra note 135.
393. See, e.g., Emma Fletcher, Pandemic Purchases Lead to Record Reports of Unreceived Goods,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/dataspotlight/2020/07/pandemic-purchases-lead-record-reports-unreceived-goods
[https://
perma.cc/HH9S-GUZF]; Randy Mac, Rental Scammers Take Advantage of Coronavirus Pandemic,
NBC L.A. (May 6, 2020), https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/rental-scammers-takeadvantage-of-coronavirus-pandemic/2358403 [https://perma.cc/6W3W-4DT7].
394. See Jeff Andrews, A Foreclosure Crisis Could Still Happen, CURBED (July 27, 2020),
https://www.curbed.com/2020/7/27/21335855/coronavirus-foreclosures-housing-crisis.
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APPENDIX A
An appendix that includes a survey of all enforcement actions
brought on behalf of tenants by agencies of the fifty states, District
of Columbia, and U.S. territories prior to August 7, 2019 can be
found online at mjlr.org.
APPENDIX B
An appendix that lists all federal tenant protection suits prior to
August 7, 2019 can be found online at mjlr.org.

